Tag Archives: ABM

Modelling Deep Structural Change in Agent-Based Social Simulation

By Thorid Wagenblast1, Nicholas Roxburgh2 and Alessandro Taberna3

1 Delft University of Technology, 0009-0003-5324-3778
2 The James Hutton Institute, 0000-0002-7821-1831
3 CMCC Foundation – Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change, RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, 0000-0002-0207-4148

Introduction

Most agent-based models (ABMs) are designed around the assumption of a broadly stable system architecture. Whether exploring emergent dynamics or testing the effects of external interventions or stressors, such models typically operate with a fixed ontology – predefined agent types, attribute classes, behavioural repertoires, processes, and social and institutional structures. While this can allow rich exploration of dynamics within the given configuration, it limits the model’s possibility space by excluding forms of change that would require the structure itself to evolve.

Some of the most consequential forms of real-world change involve shifts in the system architecture itself. These forms of change – what we refer to here as deep structural change – reconfigure the underlying logic and potentialities of the system. This may involve, for example, dramatic shifts in the environment in which agents operate, the introduction of novel technologies, or reshaping of the roles and categories through which agents understand and act in the world. Such transformations pose a fundamentally different challenge from those typically addressed in most agent-based modelling studies to date – one that pushes beyond parameter tuning or rule adjustment, and calls for new approaches to ontology design, model construction, and the conceptualisation of structural transformation and uncertainty in simulation.

Various theoretical lenses can be applied to this topic. The concepts of transformations or regime shifts seem particularly pertinent. Transformations, in contrast to incremental or minor changes, are changes that are large-scale and significant, but apart from that do not seem to consist of any specific features (Feola, 2015). The changes we explore here are more closely linked to regime shifts, which are characterised by structural changes, but with a notion of abruptness. Methods to detect and understand these regime shifts and the structural changes in relation to social simulation have been discussed for some time (Filatova, Polhill & van Ewijk, 2016). Nonetheless, there is still a lack of understanding around what this structural change entails and how this applies in social simulation, particularly ABMs.

To explore these issues, the European Social Simulation Association (ESSA) Special Interest Group on Modelling Transformative Change (SIG-MTC) organised a dedicated session at the Social Simulation Fest 2025. The session aimed to elicit experiences, ideas, and emerging practices from the modelling community around how deep structural change is understood and approached in agent-based simulation. Participants brought perspectives from a wide range of modelling contexts – including opinion dynamics, energy systems, climate adaptation, food systems, and pandemic response – with a shared interest in representing deep structural change. A majority of participants (~65%) reported that they were already actively working on, or thinking about, aspects of deep structural change in their modelling practice.

The session was framed as an opportunity to move beyond static ontologies and explore how models might incorporate adaptive structures or generative mechanisms capable of capturing deep structural shifts. As described in the session abstract:

We will discuss what concepts related to deep structural change we observe and how models can incorporate adaptive ontologies or generative mechanisms to capture deep structural shifts. Furthermore, we want to facilitate discussion on the challenges we face when trying to model these deep changes and what practices are currently used to overcome these.

This article reflects on key insights from that session, offering a synthesis of participant definitions, identified challenges, and promising directions for advancing the modelling of deep structural change in agent-based social simulation.

Defining deep structural change

Participant perspectives


To explore how participants understood deep structural change and its characteristics, we used both a pre-workshop survey (N=20) and live group discussion activities (N ≈ 20; divided into six discussion groups). The survey asked participants to define “deep structural change” in the context of social systems or simulations, and to explain how it differs from incremental change. During the workshop, groups expanded on these ideas using a collaborative Miro board, where they responded to three prompts: “What is deep structural change?”, “How does it differ from incremental change?”, and they were asked to come up with a “Group definition”. The exercises benefited from the conceptual and disciplinary diversity of participants. Individuals approached the prompts from different angles – shaped by their academic backgrounds and modelling traditions – resulting in a rich and multifaceted view of what deep structural change can entail.

Across the different exercises, a number of common themes emerged. One of the most consistent themes was the idea that deep structural change involves a reconfiguration of the system’s architecture – a shift in its underlying mechanisms, causal relationships, feedback loops, or rules of operation. This perspective goes beyond adjusting parameters; it points to transformations in what the system is, echoing the emphasis in our introductory framing on changes to the system’s underlying logic and potentialities. Participants described this in terms such as “change in causal graph”, “drastic shift in mechanisms and rules”, and “altering the whole architecture”. Some also emphasised the outcomes of such reconfigurations – the emergence of a new order, new dominant feedbacks, or a different equilibrium. As one participant put it, deep structural change is “something that brings out new structure”; others described “profound, systemic shifts that radically reshape underlying structures, processes and relationships”.

Another frequently discussed theme was the role of social and behavioural change in structural transformation – particularly shifts in values, norms, and decision-making. Several groups suggested that changes in attitudes, awareness, or shared meanings could contribute to or signal deeper structural shifts. In some cases, these were framed as indicators of transformation; in others, as contributing factors or intended outcomes of deliberate change efforts. Examples included evolving diets, institutional reform, and shifts in collective priorities. Participants referred to “behavioural change coming from a change in values and/or norms” and “a fundamental shift in values and priorities”.
Furthermore, participants discussed how deep structural change differs from incremental change. They described deep structural change as difficult to reverse and characterised by discontinuities or thresholds that shift the system into a new configuration, compared to slow, gradual incremental change. While some noted that incremental changes might accumulate and contribute to structural transformation, deep structural change was more commonly seen as involving a qualitative break from previous patterns. Several responses highlighted periods of instability or disruption as part of this process, in which the system may reorder around new structures or priorities.

Other topics emerging in passing included the distinction between scale and depth, the role of intentionality, and the extent to which a change must be profound or radical to qualify as deeply structural. This diversity of thought reflects both the complexity of deep structural change as a phenomenon and the range of domains in which it is seen as relevant. Rather than producing a single definition, the session surfaced multiple ways in which change can be considered structural, opening up productive space for further conceptual and methodological exploration.

A distilled definition

Drawing on both existing literature and the range of perspectives shared by participants, we propose the following working definition. It aims to clarify what is meant by deep structural change from the standpoint of agent-based modelling, while acknowledging its place within broader discussions of transformative change.

Deep structural change is a type of transformative change: From an agent-based modelling perspective, it entails an ontological reconfiguration. This reconfiguration is related to the emergence, disappearance, or transformation of entities, relationships, structures, and contextual features. While transformative change can occur within a fixed model ontology, deep structural change entails a revision of the ontology itself.

Challenges in modelling deep structural change

To understand the challenges modellers face when trying to incorporate deep structural change in ABMs or social simulations in general, we again asked participants in the pre-conference survey and had them brainstorm using a Miro board. We asked them about the “challenges [they] have encountered in this process” and “how [they] would overcome these challenges”. The points raised by the participants can roughly be grouped into: theory and data, model complexity, definition and detection.

The first challenge relates to availability of data on deep structural change and formalisation of related theory. Social simulations are increasingly based on empirical data to be able to model real-world phenomena more realistically. However, the data is often not good at capturing structural system changes, reflecting the status quo rather than the potential. While there are theories describing change, formalising this qualitative process comes with its own challenges, leading to hypothesising of the mechanisms and large uncertainties about model accuracy.

Second, a fine line has to be struck between keeping the model simple and understandable, while making it complex enough to allow for ontologies to shift and deep structural change to emerge. Participants highlighted the need for flexibility in the model structures, to allow new structures to develop. On the other hand, there is a risk of imposing transformation paths, so basically “telling” the model how to transform. In other words, it is often unclear how to make sure the necessary conditions for modelling deep structural change are there, without imposing the pathway of change.

The final challenge concerns the definition and detection of deep structural change. This article begins to address the question of definition, but detection remains difficult — even with greater conceptual clarity. How can one be confident that an observed change is genuinely deep and structural, and that the system has entered a new regime? This question touches on our ability to characterise system states, dominant feedbacks, necessary preconditions, and the timescales over which change occurs.

Closing remarks

Understanding transformative change in general, but increasingly so with the use of social simulation, is gaining attention to provide insights into complex issues. For social simulation modellers, it is therefore important to model deep structural changes. This workshop serves as a starting point for hopefully a wider discussion within the ESSA community on how to model transformative change. Bringing together social simulation researchers showed us that this is tackled from different angles. The definition provided above is a first attempt to combine these views, but key challenges remain. Thus far, people have approached this in a case-by-case manner; it would be useful to have a set of more systematic approaches.

The SIG-MTC will continue to examine questions around how we might effectively model deep structural change over the coming months and years, working with the ABM community to identify fruitful routes forward. We invite readers to comment  below on any further approaches to modelling deep structural change that they view as promising and to provide their own reflections on the topics discussed above. If you are interested in this topic and would like to engage further, please check out our ESSA Special Interest Group on Modelling Transformative Change or reach out to any one of us.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the participants of the SimSocFest 2025 Workshop on Modelling Deep Structural Change for their engagement in the workshop and the willingness to think along with us.

References

Feola, G. (2015). Societal transformation in response to global environmental change: A review of emerging concepts. Ambio, 44(5), 376–390. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-014-0582-z

Filatova, T., Polhill, J. G., & van Ewijk, S. (2016). Regime shifts in coupled socio-environmental systems: Review of modelling challenges and approaches. Environmental Modelling & Software, 75, 333–347. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2015.04.003


Wagenblast, T., Roxburgh, N. and Taberna, A. (2025) Modelling Deep Structural Change in Agent-Based Social Simulation. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 8 Aug 2025. https://rofasss.org/2025/08/08/structch


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Nigel Gilbert

By Corinna Elsenbroich & Petra Ahrweiler

The first piece on winners of the European Social Simulation Association’s Rosaria Conte Outstanding Contribution Award for Social Simulation.

Gilbert, a former sociologist of science, has been one of the chief links in Britain between computer scientists and sociologists of science” [1, p. 294]

Nigel has always been and still is a sociologist – not only of science, but also of technology, innovation, methods and many other subfields of sociology with important contributions in theory, empirical research and sociological methods.

He has pioneered a range of sociological areas such as Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Secondary Analysis of Government Datasets, Access to Social Security Information, Social Simulation, and Complexity Methods of Policy Evaluation.

Collins is right, however, that Nigel is one of the chief links between sociologists and computer scientists in the UK and beyond. This earned him to be elected as the first practising social scientist elected as a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering (1999). As the principal founding father of agent-based modelling as a method for the social sciences in Europe, he initiated, promoted and institutionalised a completely novel way of doing social sciences through the Centre for Research in Social Simulation (CRESS) at the University of Surrey, the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), founded Sociological Research Online (1993) and Social Research Update. Nigel has 100s of publications on all aspects of social simulation and seminal books like: Simulating societies: the computer simulation of social phenomena (Gilbert & Doran 1994), Artificial Societies: The Computer Simulation of Social Phenomena (Gilbert & Conte 1995), Simulation for the Social Scientist (Gilbert &Troitzsch 2005), and Agent-based Models (Gilbert 2019). His entrepreneurial spirit and acumen resulted in over 25 large project grants (across the UK and Europe), often in close collaboration with policy and decision makers to ensure real life impact, a simulation platform on innovation networks called SKIN, and a spin off company CECAN Ltd, training practitioners in complexity methods and bringing their use to policy evaluation projects.

Nigel is a properly interdisciplinary person, turning to the sociology of scientific knowledge in his PhD under Michael Mulkay after graduating in Engineering from Cambridge’s Emmanuel College. He joined the Sociology Department at the University of Surrey in 1976 where he became professor of sociology in 1991. Nigel was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) in 2016 for contributions to engineering and social sciences.

He was the second president of the European Social Simulation Association ESSA, the originator of the SIMSOC mailing list, launched and edited the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation from 1998-2014 and he was the first holder of the Rosaria Conte Outstanding Contribution Award for Social Simulation in 2016, an unanimous decision by the ESSA Management Committee.

Despite all of this, all these achievements and successes, Nigel is the most approachable, humble and kindest person you will ever meet. In any peril he is the person that will bring you a step forward when you need a helping hand. On asking him, after getting a CBE etc. what is the recognition that makes him most happy, he said, with the unique Nigel Gilbert twinkle in his eye, “my Rosaria Conte Award”.

References

Collins, H. (1995). Science studies and machine intelligence. In Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Revised Edition (pp. 286-301). SAGE Publications, Inc., https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412990127

Gilbert, N., & Doran, R. (Eds.). (1994). Simulating societies: the computer simulation of social phenomena. Routledge.

Gilbert, N. & Conte, R. (1995) Artificial Societies: the computer simulation of social life. Routeledge. https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/24305

Gilbert, N. (2019). Agent-based models. Sage Publications.

Gilbert, N., & Troitzsch, K. (2005). Simulation for the social scientist. Open University Press; 2nd edition.


Elsenbroich, C. & Ahrweiler, P. (2025) Nigel Gilbert. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3 Mar 2025. https://rofasss.org/2025/04/03/nigel-gilbert


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Outlining some requirements for synthetic populations to initialise agent-based models

By Nick Roxburgh1, Rocco Paolillo2, Tatiana Filatova3, Clémentine Cottineau3, Mario Paolucci2 and Gary Polhill1

1  The James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen AB15 8QH, United Kingdom {nick.roxburgh,gary.polhill}@hutton.ac.uk

2  Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies, Rome, Italy {rocco.paolillo,mario.paolucci}@cnr.it

3 Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands {c.cottineau,t.filatova}@tudelft.nl

Abstract. We propose a wish list of features that would greatly enhance population synthesis methods from the perspective of agent-based modelling. The challenge of synthesising appropriate populations is heightened in agent-based modelling by the emphasis on complexity, which requires accounting for a wide array of features. These often include, but are not limited to: attributes of agents, their location in space, the ways they make decisions and their behavioural dynamics. In the real-world, these aspects of everyday human life can be deeply interconnected, with these associations being highly consequential in shaping outcomes. Initialising synthetic populations in ways that fail to respect these covariances can therefore compromise model efficacy, potentially leading to biased and inaccurate simulation outcomes.

1 Introduction

With agent-based models (ABMs), the rationale for creating ever more empirically informed, attribute-rich synthetic populations is clear: the closer agents and their collectives mimic their  real-world counterparts, the more accurate the models can be and the wider the range of questions they can be used to address (Zhou et al., 2022). However, while many ABMs would benefit from synthetic populations that more fully capture the complexity and richness of real-world populations – including their demographic and psychological attributes, social networks, spatial realms, decision making, and behavioural dynamics – most efforts are stymied by methodological and data limitations. One reason for this is that population synthesis methods have predominantly been developed with microsimulation applications in mind (see review by Chapuis et al. (2022)), rather than ABM. We therefore argue that there is a need for improved population synthesis methods, attuned to support the specific requirements of the ABM community, as well as commonly encountered data constraints. We propose a wish list of features for population synthesis methods that could significantly enhance the capability and performance of ABMs across a wide range of application domains, and we highlight several promising approaches that could help realise these ambitions. Particular attention is paid to methods that prioritise accounting for covariance of characteristics and attributes.

2 The interrelationships among aspects of daily life

2.1 Demographic and psychological attributes

To effectively replicate real-world dynamics, ABMs must realistically depict demographic and psychological attributes at both individual and collective levels. A critical aspect of this realism is accounting for the covariance of such attributes. For instance, interactions between race and income levels significantly influence spatial segregation patterns in the USA, as demonstrated in studies like Bruch (2014).

Several approaches to population synthesis have been developed over the years, often with a specific focus on assignment of demographic attributes. That said, where psychological attributes are collected in surveys alongside demographic data, they can be incorporated into synthetic populations just like other demographic attributes (e.g., Wu et al. (2022)). Among the most established methods is Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF). While capable of accounting for covariances, it does have significant limitations. One of these is that it “matches distributions only at one demographic level (i.e., either household or individual)” (Zhou et al., 2022 p.2). Other approaches have sought to overcome this – such as Iterative Proportional Updating, Combinatorial Optimisation, and deep learning methods – but they invariably have their own limitations and downsides, though the extent to which these will matter depends on the application. In their overview of the existing population synthesis landscape, Zhou et al., (2022) suggest that deep learning methods appear particularly promising for high-dimensional cases. Such approaches tend to be data hungry, though – a potentially significant barrier to exploitation given many studies already face challenges with survey availability and sample size.

2.2 Social networks

Integrating realistic social networks into ABMs during population synthesis is crucial for effectively mimicking real-world social interactions, such as those underlying epidemic spread, opinion dynamics, and economic transactions (Amblard et al., 2015). In practice, this means generating networks that link agents by edges that represent particular associations between them. These networks may need to be weighted, directional, or multiplex, and potentially need to account for co-dependencies and correlations between layers. Real-world social networks emerge from distinct processes and tendencies. For example, homophily preferences strongly influence the likelihood of friendship formation, with connections more likely to have developed in cases where agents share attributes like age, gender, socio-economic context, and location (McPherson et al., 2001). Another example is personality which can strongly influence the size and nature of an individual’s social network (Zell et al., 2014). For models where social interactions play an important role, it is therefore critical that consideration be given to the underlying factors and mechanisms that are likely to have influenced the development of social networks historically, if synthetic networks are to have any chance of reasonably depicting real world network structures.

Generating synthetic social networks is challenging due to often limited or unavailable data. Consequently, researchers tend to use simple models like regular lattices, random graphs, small-world networks, scale-free networks, and models based on spatial proximity. These models capture basic elements of real-world social networks but can fall short in complex scenarios. For instance, Jiang et al. (2022) describes a model where agents, already assigned to households and workplaces, form small-world networks based on employment or educational ties. While this approach accounts for spatial and occupational similarities, it overlooks other factors, limiting its applicability for networks like friendships that rely on personal history and intangible attributes.

To address these limitations, more sophisticated methods have been proposed, including Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) (Robins et al., 2007) and Yet Another Network Generator (YANG) (Amblard et al., 2015). However, they also come with their own challenges; for example, ERGMs sometimes misrepresent the likelihood of certain network structures, deviating from real-world observations.

2.3 Spatial locations

The places where people live, work, take their leisure and go to school are critically interlinked and interrelated with social networks and demographics. Spatial location also affects options open to people, including transport, access to services, job opportunities and social encounters. ABMs’ capabilities in representing space explicitly and naturally is a key attraction for geographers interested in social simulation and population synthesis (Cottineau et al., 2018). Ignoring the spatial concentration of agents with common traits, or failing to account for the effects that space has on other aspects of everyday human existence, risks overlooking a critical factor that influences a wide range of social dynamics and outcomes.

Spatial microsimulation generates synthetic populations tailored to defined geographic zones, such as census tracts (Lovelace and Dumont, 2017). However, many ABM applications require agents to be assigned to specific dwellings and workplaces, not just aggregated zones. While approaches to dealing with this have been proposed, agreement on best practice is yet to cohere. Certain agent-location assignments can be implemented using straightforward heuristic methods without greatly compromising fidelity, if heuristics align well with real-world practices. For example, children might be allocated to schools simply based on proximity, such as in Jiang et al., (2022). Others use rule-based or stochastic methods to account for observed nuances and random variability, though these often take the form of crude approximations. One of the more well-rounded examples is detailed by Zhou et al. (2022). They start by generating a synthetic population, which they then assign to specific dwellings and jobs using a combination of rule-based matching heuristic and probabilistic models. Dwellings are assigned to households by considering factors like household size, income, and dwelling type jointly. Meanwhile, jobs are assigned to workers using a destination choice model that predicts the probability of selecting locations based on factors such as sector-specific employment opportunities, commuting costs, and interactions between commuting costs and individual worker attributes. In this way, spatial location choices are more closely aligned with the diverse attributes of agents. The challenge with such an approach is to obtain sufficient microdata to inform the rules and probabilities.

2.4 Decision-making and behavioural dynamics

In practice, peoples’ decision-making and behaviours are influenced by an array of factors, including their individual characteristics such as wealth, health, education, gender, and age, their social network, and their geographical circumstances. These factors shape – among other things – the information agents’ are exposed to, the choices open to them, the expectations placed on them, and their personal beliefs and desires (Lobo et al., 2023). Consequently, accurately initialising such factors is important for ensuring that agents are predisposed to make decisions and take actions in ways that reflect how their real world counterparts might behave. Furthermore, the assignment of psychographic attributes to agents necessitates the prior establishment of these foundational characteristics as they are often closely entwined.

Numerous agent decision-making architectures have been proposed (see Wijermans et al. (2023)). Many suggest that a range of agent state attributes could, or even should, be taken into consideration when evaluating information and selecting behaviours. For example, the MoHub Framework (Schlüter et al., 2017) proposes four classes of attributes as potentially influential in the decision-making process: needs/goals, knowledge, assets, and social. In practice, however, the factors taken into consideration in decision-making procedures tend to be much narrower. This is understandable given the higher data demands that richer decision-making procedures entail. However, it is also regrettable given we know that decision-making often draws on many more factors than are currently accounted for, and the ABM community has worked hard to develop the tools needed to depict these richer processes.

3 Practicalities

Our wish list of features for synthetic population algorithms far exceeds their current capabilities. Perhaps the main issue today is data scarcity, especially concerning less tangible aspects of populations, such as psychological attributes and social networks, where systematic data collection is often more limited. Another significant challenge is that existing algorithms struggle to manage the numerous conditional probabilities involved in creating realistic populations, excelling on niche measures of performance but not from a holistic perspective. Moreover, there are accessibility issues with population synthesis tools. The next generation of methods need to be made more accessible to non-specialists through developing easy to use stand-alone tools or plugins for widely used platforms like NetLogo, else they risk not having their potential exploited.

Collectively, these issues may necessitate a fundamental rethink of how synthetic populations are generated. The potential benefits of successfully addressing these challenges are immense. By enhancing the capabilities of synthetic population tools to meet the wish list set out here, we can significantly improve model realism and expand the potential applications of social simulation, as well as strengthen credibility with stakeholders. More than this, though, such advancements would enhance our ability to draw meaningful insights, respecting the complexities of real-world dynamics. Most critically, better representation of the diversity of actors and circumstances reduces the risk of overlooking factors that might adversely impact segments of the population – something there is arguably a moral imperative to strive for.

Acknowledgements

MP & RP were supported by FOSSR (Fostering Open Science in Social Science Research), funded by the European Union – NextGenerationEU under NPRR Grant agreement n. MUR IR0000008. CC was supported by the ERC starting Grant SEGUE (101039455).

References

Amblard, F., Bouadjio-Boulic, A., Gutiérrez, C.S. and Gaudou, B. 2015, December. Which models are used in social simulation to generate social networks? A review of 17 years of publications in JASSS. In 2015 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC) (pp. 4021-4032). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/WSC.2015.7408556

Bruch, E.E., 2014. How population structure shapes neighborhood segregation. American Journal of Sociology119(5), pp.1221-1278. https://doi.org/10.1086/675411

Chapuis, K., Taillandier, P. and Drogoul, A., 2022. Generation of synthetic populations in social simulations: a review of methods and practices. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation25(2). https://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.4762

Cottineau, C., Perret, J., Reuillon, R., Rey-Coyrehourcq, S. and Vallée, J., 2018, March. An agent-based model to investigate the effects of social segregation around the clock on social disparities in dietary behaviour. In CIST2018-Représenter les territoires/Representing territories (pp. 584-589). https://hal.science/hal-01854398v1

Jiang, N., Crooks, A.T., Kavak, H., Burger, A. and Kennedy, W.G., 2022. A method to create a synthetic population with social networks for geographically-explicit agent-based models. Computational Urban Science2(1), p.7. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43762-022-00034-1

Lobo, I., Dimas, J., Mascarenhas, S., Rato, D. and Prada, R., 2023. When “I” becomes “We”: Modelling dynamic identity on autonomous agents. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation26(3). https://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.5146

Lovelace, R. and Dumont, M., 2017. Spatial microsimulation with R. Chapman and Hall/CRC. https://spatial-microsim-book.robinlovelace.net

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J.M., 2001. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annual review of sociology27(1), pp.415-444. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415

Robins, G., Pattison, P., Kalish, Y. and Lusher, D., 2007. An introduction to exponential random graph (p*) models for social networks. Social networks29(2), pp.173-191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2006.08.002

Schlüter, M., Baeza, A., Dressler, G., Frank, K., Groeneveld, J., Jager, W., Janssen, M.A., McAllister, R.R., Müller, B., Orach, K. and Schwarz, N., 2017. A framework for mapping and comparing behavioural theories in models of social-ecological systems. Ecological economics131, pp.21-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.08.008

Wijermans, N., Scholz, G., Chappin, É., Heppenstall, A., Filatova, T., Polhill, J.G., Semeniuk, C. and Stöppler, F., 2023. Agent decision-making: The Elephant in the Room-Enabling the justification of decision model fit in social-ecological models. Environmental Modelling & Software170, p.105850. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2023.105850

Wu, G., Heppenstall, A., Meier, P., Purshouse, R. and Lomax, N., 2022. A synthetic population dataset for estimating small area health and socio-economic outcomes in Great Britain. Scientific Data9(1), p.19. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-022-01124-9

Zell, D., McGrath, C. and Vance, C.M., 2014. Examining the interaction of extroversion and network structure in the formation of effective informal support networks. Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management15(2), pp.59-81. https://jbam.scholasticahq.com/article/17938.pdf

Zhou, M., Li, J., Basu, R. and Ferreira, J., 2022. Creating spatially-detailed heterogeneous synthetic populations for agent-based microsimulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems91, p.101717. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2021.101717


Roxburgh, N., Paolillo, R., Filatova, T., Cottineau, C., Paolucci, M. and Polhill, G. (2025) Outlining some requirements for synthetic populations to initialise agent-based models. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 27 Jan 2025. https://rofasss.org/2025/01/29/popsynth


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Quantum computing in the social sciences

By Emile Chappin and Gary Polhill

The dream

What could quantum computing mean for the computational social sciences? Although quantum computing is at an early stage, this is the right time to dream about precisely that question for two reasons. First, we need to keep the computational social sciences ‘in the conversation’ about use cases for quantum computing to ensure our potential needs are discussed. Second, thinking about how quantum computing could affect the way we work in the computational social sciences could lead to interesting research questions, new insights into social systems and their uncertainties, and form the basis of advances in our area of work.

At first glance, quantum computing and the computational social sciences seem unrelated. Computational social science uses computer programs written in high-level languages to explore the consequences of assumptions as macro-level system patterns based on coded rules for micro-level behaviour (e.g., Gilbert, 2007). Quantum computing is in an early phase, with the state-of-the-art being in the order of 100s of qubits [1],[2], and a wide range of applications are envisioned (Hassija, 2020), e.g., in the areas of physics (Di Meglio et al., 2024) and drug discovery (Blunt et al., 2022). Hence, the programming of quantum computers is also in an early phase. Major companies (e.g., IBM, Microsoft, Alphabet, Intel, Rigetti Computing) are investing heavily and have put out high expectations – though how much of this is hyperbole to attract investors and how much it is backed up by substance remains to be seen. This means it is still hard to comprehend what opportunities may come from scaling up.

Our dream is that quantum computing enables us to represent human decision-making on a much larger scale, do more justice to how decisions come about, and embrace the influences people have on each other. It would respect that people’s actual choices are undetermined until they have to show behaviour. On a philosophical level, these features are consistent with how quantum computation operates. Applying quantum computing to decision-making with interactions may help us inform or discover behavioural theory and contribute to complex systems science.

The mysticism around quantum computing

There is mysticism around what qubits are. To start thinking about how quantum computing could be relevant for computational social science, there is no direct need to understand the physics of how qubits are physically set up. However, it is necessary to understand the logic and how quantum computers operate. At the logical level, there are similarities between quantum and traditional computers.

The main similarity is that the building blocks are bits and that they are either 0 or 1, but only when you measure them. A second similarity is that quantum computers work with ‘instructions’. Quantum ‘processors’ alter the state of the bits in a ‘memory’ using programs that comprise sequences of ‘instructions’ (e.g., Sutor, 2019).

There are also differences. They are: 1) qubits are programmed to have probabilities of being a zero or a one, 2) qubits have no determined value until they are measured, and 3) multiple qubits can be entangled. The latter means the values (when measured) depend on each other.

Operationally speaking, quantum computers are expected to augment conventional computers in a ‘hybrid’ computing environment. This means we can expect to use traditional computer programs to do everything around a quantum program, not least to set up and analyse the outcomes.

Programming quantum computers

Until now, programming languages for quantum computing are low-level; like assembly languages for regular machines. Quantum programs are therefore written very close to ‘the hardware’. Similarly, in the early days of electronic computers, instructions for processors to perform directly were programmed directly: punched cards contained machine language instructions. Over time, computers got bigger, more was asked of them, and their use became more widespread and embedded in everyday life. At a practical level, different processors, which have different instruction sets, and ever-larger programs became more and more unwieldy to write in machine language. Higher-level languages were developed, and reached a point where modellers could use the languages to describe and simulate dynamic systems. Our code is still ultimately translated into these lower-level instructions when we compile software, or it is interpreted at run-time. The instructions now developed for quantum computing are akin to the early days of conventional computing, but development of higher-level programming languages for quantum computers may happen quickly.

At the start, qubits are put in entangled states (e.g., Sutor, 2019); the number of qubits at your disposal makes up the memory. A quantum computer program is a set of instructions that is followed. Each instruction alters the memory, but only by changing the probabilities of qubits being 0 or 1 and their entanglement. Instruction sets are packaged into so-called quantum circuits. The instructions operate on all qubits at the same time, (you can think of this in terms of all probabilities needing to add up to 100%). This means the speed of a quantum program does not depend on the scale of the computation in number of qubits, but only depends on the number of instructions that one executes in a program. Since qubits can be entangled, quantum computing can do calculations that take too long to run on a normal computer.

Quantum instructions are typically the inverse of themselves: if you execute an instruction twice, you’re back at the state before the first operation. This means you can reverse a quantum program simply by executing the program again, but now in reverse order of the instructions. The only exception to this is the so-called ‘read’ instruction, by which the value is determined for each qubit to either be 1 or 0. This is the natural end of the quantum program.

Recent developments in quantum computing and their roadmaps

Several large companies such as Microsoft, IBM and Alphabet are investing heavily in developing quantum computing. The route currently is to move up in the scale of these computers with respect to the number of qubits they have and the number of gates (instructions) that can be run. IBM’s roadmap they suggest growing to 7500 instructions, as quickly as 2025[3]. At the same time, programming languages for quantum computing are being developed, on the basis of the types of instructions above. At the moment, researchers can gain access to actual quantum computers (or run quantum programs on simulated quantum hardware). For example, IBM’s Qiskit[4] is one of the first open-source software developing kit for quantum computing.

A quantum computer doing agent-based modelling

The exponential growth in quantum computing capacity (Coccia et al., 2024) warrants us to consider how it may be used in the computational social sciences. Here is a first sketch. What if there is a behavioural theory that says something about ‘how’ different people decide in a specific context on a specifical behavioural action. Can we translate observed behaviour into the properties of a quantum program and explore the consequences of what we can observe? Or, in contrast, can we unravel the assumptions underneath our observations? Could we look at alternative outcomes that could also have been possible in the same system, under the same conceptualization? Given what we observe, what other system developments could have had emerged that also are possible (and not highly unlikely)? Can we unfold possible pathways without brute-forcing a large experiment? These questions are, we believe, different when approached from a perspective of quantum computing. For one, the reversibility of quantum programs (until measuring) may provide unique opportunities. This also means, doing such analyses may inspire new kinds of social theory, or it may give a reflection on the use of existing theory.

One of the early questions is how we may use qubits to represent modelled elements in social simulations. Here we sketch basic alternative routes, with alternative ideas. For each strain we include a very rudimentary application to both Schelling’s model of segregation and the Traffic Basic model, both present in NetLogo model library.

Qubits as agents

A basic option could be to represent an agent by a qubit. Thinking of one type of stylized behaviour, an action that can be taken, then a quantum bit could represent whether that action is taken or not. Instructions in the quantum program would capture the relations between actions that can be taken by the different agents, interventions that may affect specific agents. For Schelling’s model, this would have to imply to show whether segregation takes place or not. For Traffic Basic, this would be what the probability is for having traffic jams. Scaling up would mean we would be able to represent many interacting agents without the simulation to slow down. This is, by design, abstract and stylized. But it may help to answer whether a dynamic simulation on a quantum computer can be obtained and visualized.

Decision rules coded in a quantum computer

A second option is for an agent to perform a quantum program as part of their decision rules. The decision-making structure should then match with the logic of a quantum computer. This may be a relevant ontological reference to how brains work and some of the theory that exists on cognition and behaviour. Consider a NetLogo model with agents that have a variety of properties that get translated to a quantum program. A key function for agents would be that the agent performs a quantum calculation on the basis of a set of inputs. The program would then capture how different factors interact and whether the agent performs specific actions, i.e., show particular behaviour. For Schelling’s segregation model, it would be the decision either to move (and in what direction) or not. For Traffic Basic it would lead to a unique conceptualization of heterogeneous agents. But for such simple models it would not necessarily take benefit of the scale-advantage that quantum computers have, because most of the computation occurs on traditional computers and the limited scope of the decision logic of these models. Rather, it invites to developing much more rich and very different representations of how decisions are made by humans. Different brain functions may all be captured: memory, awareness, attitudes, considerations, etc. If one agent’s decision-making structure would fit in a quantum computer, experiments can already be set up, running one agent after the other (just as it happens on traditional computers). And if a small, reasonable number of agents would fit, one could imagine group-level developments. If not of humans, this could represent companies that function together, either in a value chain or as competitors in a market. Because of this, it may be revolutionary:  let’s consider this as quantum agent-based modelling.

Using entanglement

Intuitively one could consider the entanglement if qubits to be either represent the connection between different functions in decision making, the dependencies between agents that would typically interact, or the effects of policy interventions on agent decisions. Entanglement of qubits could also represent the interaction of time steps, capturing path dependencies of choices, limiting/determining future options. This is the reverse of memory: what if the simulation captures some form of anticipation by entangling future options in current choices. Simulations of decisions may then be limited, myopic in their ability to forecast. By thinking through such experiments, doing the work, it may inspire new heuristics that represent bounded rationality of human decision making. For Schelling’s model this could be the local entanglement restricting movement, it could be restricting movement because of future anticipated events, which contributes to keep the status quo. For Traffic Basic, one could forecast traffic jams and discover heuristics to avoid them which, in turn may inspire policy interventions.

Quantum programs representing system-level phenomena

The other end of the spectrum can also be conceived. As well as observing other agents, agents could also interact with a system in order to make their observations and decisions where the system with which they interact with itself is a quantum program. The system could be an environmental, or physical system, for example. It would be able to have the stochastic, complex nature that real world systems show. For some systems, problems could possibly be represented in an innovative way. For Schelling’s model, it could be the natural system with resources that agents benefit from if they are in the surroundings; resources having their own dynamics depending on usage. For Traffic Basic, it may represent complexities in the road system that agents can account for while adjusting their speed.

Towards a roadmap for quantum computing in the social sciences

What would be needed to use quantum computation in the social sciences? What can we achieve by taking the power of high-performance computing combined with quantum computers when the latter scale up? Would it be possible to reinvent how we try to predict the behaviour of humans by embracing the domain of uncertainty that also is essential in how we may conceptualise cognition and decision-making? Is quantum agent-based modelling at one point feasible? And how do the potential advantages compare to bringing it into other methods in the social sciences (e.g. choice models)?

A roadmap would include the following activities:

  • Conceptualise human decision-making and interactions in terms of quantum computing. What are promising avenues of the ideas presented here and possibly others?
  • Develop instruction sets/logical building blocks that are ontologically linked to decision-making in the social sciences. Connect to developments for higher-level programming languages for quantum computing.
  • Develop a first example. One could think of reproducing one of the traditional models. Either an agent-based model, such as Schelling’s model of segregation or Basic Traffic, or a cellular automata model, such as game-of-life. The latter may be conceptualized with a relatively small number of cells and could be a valuable demonstration of the possibilities.
  • Develop quantum computing software for agent-based modelling, e.g., as a quantum extension for NetLogo, MESA, or for other agent-based modelling packages.

Let us become inspired to develop a more detailed roadmap for quantum computing for the social sciences. Who wants to join in making this dream a reality?

Notes

[1] https://newsroom.ibm.com/2022-11-09-IBM-Unveils-400-Qubit-Plus-Quantum-Processor-and-Next-Generation-IBM-Quantum-System-Two

[2] https://www.fastcompany.com/90992708/ibm-quantum-system-two

[3] https://www.ibm.com/roadmaps/quantum/

[4] https://github.com/Qiskit/qiskit-ibm-runtime

References

Blunt, Nick S., Joan Camps, Ophelia Crawford, Róbert Izsák, Sebastian Leontica, Arjun Mirani, Alexandra E. Moylett, et al. “Perspective on the Current State-of-the-Art of Quantum Computing for Drug Discovery Applications.” Journal of Chemical Theory and Computation 18, no. 12 (December 13, 2022): 7001–23. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.jctc.2c00574.

Coccia, M., S. Roshani and M. Mosleh, “Evolution of Quantum Computing: Theoretical and Innovation Management Implications for Emerging Quantum Industry,” in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, vol. 71, pp. 2270-2280, 2024, https://doi: 10.1109/TEM.2022.3175633.

Di Meglio, Alberto, Karl Jansen, Ivano Tavernelli, Constantia Alexandrou, Srinivasan Arunachalam, Christian W. Bauer, Kerstin Borras, et al. “Quantum Computing for High-Energy Physics: State of the Art and Challenges.” PRX Quantum 5, no. 3 (August 5, 2024): 037001. https://doi.org/10.1103/PRXQuantum.5.037001.

Gilbert, N., Agent-based models. SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007. ISBN 978-141-29496-44

Hassija, V., Chamola, V., Saxena, V., Chanana, V., Parashari, P., Mumtaz, S. and Guizani, M. (2020), Present landscape of quantum computing. IET Quantum Commun., 1: 42-48. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-qtc.2020.0027

Sutor, R. S. (2019). Dancing with Qubits: How quantum computing works and how it can change the world. Packt Publishing Ltd.


Chappin, E. & Polhill, G (2024) Quantum computing in the social sciences. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 25 Sep 2024. https://rofasss.org/2024/09/24/quant


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Delusional Generality – how models can give a false impression of their applicability even when they lack any empirical foundation

By Bruce Edmonds1, Dino Carpentras2, Nick Roxburgh3, Edmund Chattoe-Brown4 and Gary Polhill3

  1. Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester Metropolitan University
  2. Computational Social Science, ETH Zurich
  3. James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen
  4. University of Leicester

“Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in shape of a camel?
Polonius: By the mass, and ‘tis like a camel, indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius: It is backed like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or like a whale?
Polonius: Very like a whale.

Models and Generality

The essence of a model is that it represents – if it is not a model of something it is not a model at all (Zeigler 1976, Wartofsky 1979). A random bit of code or set of equations is not a model. The point of a model is that one can use the model to infer or understand some aspects about what it represents. However, models can represent a variety of kinds of things in a variety of ways (Edmonds & al. 2019) – it can represent ideas, correspond to data, or aspects of other models and it can represent each of these in either a vague or precise manner. To completely understand a model – its construction, properties and working – one needs to understand how it does this mapping. This piece focuses attention on this mapping, rather than the internal construction of models.

What a model reliably represents may be a single observed situation, but it might satisfactorily represent more than one such situation. The range of situations that the model satisfactorily represents is called the “scope” of the model (what is “satisfactory” depending on the purpose for which the model is being used). The more extensive the scope, the more “general” we say the model is. A model that only represents one case has no generality at all and may be more in the nature of a description.

There is a hunger for general accounts of social phenomena (let us call these ‘theories’). However, this hunger is often frustrated by the sheer complexity and ‘messiness’ involved in such phenomena. If every situation we observe is essentially different, then no such theory is possible. However, we hope that this is not the case for the social world and, indeed, informal observation suggests that there is, at least some, commonality between situations – in other words, that some kind of reliable generalisation about social phenomena might be achievable, however modest (Merton 1968). This piece looks at two kinds of applicability – analogical applicability and empirical applicability – and critiques those that conflate them. Although the expertise of the authors is in the agent-based modelling of social phenomena, and so we restrict our discussion to this, we strongly suspect that our arguments are true for many kinds of modelling across a range of domains.

In the next sections we contrast two uses for models: as analogies (ways of thinking about observed systems) and those that intend to represent empirical data in a more precise way. There are, of course, other uses of model such as that of exploring theory which have nothing to do with anything observed.

Models used as analogies

Analogical applicability comes from the flexibility of the human mind in interpreting accounts in terms of the different situations. When we encounter a new situation, the account is mapped onto it – the account being used as an analogy for understanding this situation. Such accounts are typically in the form of a narrative, but a model can also be used as an analogy (which is the case we are concerned with here). The flexibility with which this mapping can be constructed means that such an account can be related to a wide range of phenomena. Such analogical mapping can lead to an impression that the account has a wide range of applicability. Analogies are a powerful tool for thinking since it may give us some insights into otherwise novel situations. There are arguments that analogical thinking is a fundamental aspect of human thought (Hofstadter 1995) and language (Lakoff 2008). We can construct and use analogical mappings so effortlessly that they seem natural to us. The key thing about analogical thinking is that the mapping from the analogy to the situation to which it is applied is re-invented each time – there is no fixed relationship between the analogy and what it might be applied to. We are so good at doing this that we may not be aware of how different the constructed mapping is each time. However, its flexibility comes at a cost, namely that because there is no well-defined relationship with what it applies to, the mapping tends to be more intuitive than precise. An analogy can give insights but analogical reasoning suggests rather than establishes anything reliably and you cannot empirically test it (since analogical mappings can be adjusted to avoid falsification). Such “ways of thinking” might be helpful, but equally might be misleading [note ‎1].

Just because the content of an analogy might be expressed formally does not change any of this (Edmonds 2018), in fact formally expressed analogies might give the impression of being applicable, but often are only related to anything observed via ideas – the model relates to some ideas, and the ideas relate to reality (Edmonds 2000). Using models as analogies is a valid use of models but this is not an empirically reliable one (Edmonds et al. 2019). Arnold (2013) makes a powerful argument that many of the more abstract simulation models are of this variety and simply not relatable to empirically observed cases and data at all – although these give the illusion of wide applicability, that applicability is not empirical. In physics the ways of thinking about atomic or subatomic entities have changed over time whilst the mathematically-expressed, empirically-relevant models have not (Hartman 1997). Although Thompson (2022) concentrates on mathematically formulated models, she also distinguishes between well-validated empirical models and those that just encapsulate the expertise/opinion of the modeller. She gives some detailed examples of where the latter kind had disproportionate influence, beyond that of other expertise, just because it was in the form of a model (e.g. the economic impact of climate change).

An example of an analogical model is described in Axelrod (1984) – a formalised tournament where algorithmically-expressed strategies are pitted against each other, playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. It is shown how the ‘tit for tat’ strategy can survive against many other mixes of strategies (static or evolving).  In the book, the purpose of the model is to suggest a new way of thinking about the evolution of cooperation. The book claims the idea ‘explains’ many observed phenomena, but this in an analogical manner – no precise relationship with any observed measurements is described. There is no validation of the model here or in the more academic paper that described these results (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981).

Of course, researchers do not usually call their models “analogies” or “analogical” explicitly but tend to use other phrasings that imply a greater importance. An exception is Epstein (2008) where it is explicitly listed as one of the 15 modelling purposes, other than prediction, that he discusses. Here he says such models are “…more than beautiful testaments to the unifying power of models: they are headlights in dark unexplored territory.” (ibid.) thus suggesting their use in thinking about phenomena where we do not already have reliable empirical models. Anything that helps us think about such phenomena could be useful, but that does not mean they are at all reliable. As Herbert Simon said: “Metaphor and analogy can be helpful, or they can be misleading. ” (Simon 1968, p. 467).

Another purpose listed in Epstein (2008) is to “Illuminate core dynamics”. After raising the old chestnut that “All models are wrong”, he goes on to justify them on the grounds that “…they capture qualitative behaviors of overarching interest”. This is fine if the models are, in fact, known to be useful as more than vague analogies [Note 2] – that they do, in some sense, approximate observed phenomena – but this is not the case with novel models that have not been empirically tested. This phrase is more insidious, because it implies that the dynamics that have been illuminated by the model are “core” – some kind of approximation of what is important about the phenomena, allowing for future elaborations to refine the representation. This implies a process where an initially rough idea is iteratively improved. However, this is premature because we do not know if what has been abstracted away in the abstract model was essential to the dynamics of the target phenomena or not without empirical testing – this is just assumed or asserted based on the intuitions of the modeller.

This idea of the “core dynamics” leads to some paradoxical situations – where a set of competing models are all deemed to be core. Indeed, the literature has shown how the same phenomenon can be modelled in many contrasting ways. For instance, political polarisation has been modelled through models with mechanisms for repulsion, bounded confidence, reinforcement, or even just random fluctuations, to name a few (Flache et al., 2017; Banisch & Olbrich 2019; Carpentras et al. 2022). However, it is likely that only a few of them contribute substantially to the political polarisation we observe in the real world, and so that all the others are not a real “core dynamic” but until we have more empirical work we do not know which are core and which not.

A related problem with analogical models is that, even when relying on parsimony principles [Note 3], it is not possible to decide which model is better. This aspect, combined with the constant production of new models, can makes the relevant literature increasingly difficult to navigate as models proliferate without any empirical selection, especially for researchers new to ABM. Furthermore, most analogical models define their object of study in an imprecise manner so that it is hard to evaluate whether they are even intended to capture element of any particular observed situation. For example, opinion dynamics models rarely define the type of interaction they represent (e.g. in person vs online) or even what an opinion is. This has led to cases where even knowledge of facts has been studied as “opinions” (e.g. Chacoma & Zanette, 2015).

In summary, analogical models can be a useful tool to start thinking about complex phenomena. However, the danger with them is that they give an impression of progress but result in more confusion than clarity, possibly slowing down scientific progress. Once one has some possible insights, one needs to confront these with empirical data to determine which are worth further investigation.

Models that relate directly to empirical data

An empirical model, in contrast, has a well-defined way of mapping to the phenomena it represents. For example, the variables of the gas laws (volume, temperature and pressure) are measured using standard methods developed over a long period of time, one does not invent a new way of doing this each time the laws are applied. In this case, the ways of measuring these properties have developed alongside the mathematical models of the laws so that these work reliably under broad (and well known) conditions and cannot be adjusted at the whim of a modeller. Empirical generality comes from when a model applies reliably to many different situations – in the case of the gas laws, to a wide range of materials in gaseous form to a high degree of accuracy.

Empirical models can be used for different purposes, including: prediction, explanation and description (Edmonds et al. 2019). Each of these uses how the model is mapped to empirical data in different ways, to reflect these purposes. With a descriptive model the mapping is one-way from empirical data to the model to justify the different parts. In a predictive model, the initial model setup is determined from known data and the model is then run to get its results. These results are then mapped back to what we might expect as a prediction, which can be later compared to empirically measured values to check the model’s validity. An explanatory model supports a complex explanation of some known outcomes in terms of a set of processes, structures and parameter values. When it is shown that the outcomes of such a model sufficiently match those from the observed data – the model represents a complex chain of causation that would result in that data in terms of the processes, structures and parameter values it comprised. It thus supports an explanation in terms of the model and its input of what was observed. In each of these three cases the mapping from empirical data to the model happens in a different order and maybe in a different direction, however they all depend upon the mapping being well defined.

Cartwright (1983), studying how physics works, distinguished between explanatory and phenomenological laws – the former explains but does not necessary relate exactly to empirical data (such as when we fit a line to data using regression), whilst the latter fits the data but does not necessarily explain (like the gas laws). Thus the jobs of theoretical explanation and empirical prediction are done by different models or theories (often calling the explanatory version “theory” and the empirical versions “models”). However, in physics the relationship between the two is, itself, examined so that the “bridging laws” between them are well understood, especially in formal terms. In this case, we attribute reliable empirical meaning to the explanatory theories to the extent that the connection to the data is precise, even though it is done via the intermediary of an “phenomenological” model because both mappings (explanatory↔phenomenological and phenomenological↔empirical data) are precise and well established. The point is that the total mapping from model or theory to empirical data is not subject to interpretation or post-hoc adjustment to improve its fit.

ABMs are often quite complicated and require many parameters or other initialising input to be specified before they can be run. If some of these are not empirically determinable (even in principle) then these might be guessed at using a process of “calibration”, that is searching the space of possible initialisations for some values for which some measured outcomes of the results match other empirical data. If the model has been separately shown to be empirically reliable then one could do such a calibration to suggest what these input values might have been. Such a process might establish that the model captures a possible explanation of the fitted outcomes (in terms of the model plus those backward-inferred input values), but this is not a very strong relationship, since many models are very flexible and so could fit a wide range of possible outcomes. The reliability of such a suggested explanation, supported by the model, is only relative to (a) the empirical reliability of any theory or other assumptions the model is built upon (b) how flexibly the model outcomes can be adjusted to fit the target data and (c) how precisely the choice of outcome measures and fit are. Thus, calibration does not provide strong evidence of the empirical adequacy of an ABM and any explanation supported by such a procedure is only relative to the ‘wiggle room’ afforded by free parameters and unknown input data as well as any assumptions used in the making of the model. However, empirical calibration is better than none and may empirically fix the context in which theoretical exploration occurs – showing that the model is, at least, potentially applicable to the case being considered [Note 4].

An example of a model that is strongly grounded in empirical data is the “538” model of the US electoral college for presidential elections (Silver 2012). This is not an ABM but more like a micro-simulation. It aggregates the uncertainty from polling data to make probabilistic predictions about what this means for the outcomes. The structure of the model comes directly from the rules of the electoral college, the inputs are directly derived from the polling data and it makes predictions about the results that can be independently checked. It does a very specific, but useful job, in translating the uncertainty of the polling data into the uncertainty about the outcome.

Why this matters

If people did not confuse the analogical and empirical cases, there would not be a problem. However, researchers seem to suffer from a variety of “Kuhnian Spectacles” (Kuhn 1962) – namely that because they view their target systems through an analogical model, they tend to think that this is how that system actually is – i.e. that the model has not just analogical but also empirical applicability. This is understandable, we use many layers of analogy to navigate our world and in many every-day cases it is practical to conflate our models with the reality we deal with (when they are very reliable). However, people who claim to be scientists are under an obligation to be more cautious and precise than this, since others might wish to rely upon our theories and models (this is, after all, why they support us in our privileged position). However, such caution is not always followed. There are cases where modellers declare their enterprise a success even after a long period without any empirical backing, making a variety of excuses instead of coming clean about this lack (Arnold 2015).

Another fundamental aspect is that agent-based models can be very interdisciplinary and, because of that, they can be used also by researchers in different fields. However, many fields do not consider models as simple analogies, especially when they provide precise mathematical relationship among variables. This can easily result in confusions where the analogical applicability of ABMs is interpreted as empirical in another field.

Of course, we may be hopeful that, sometime in the future, our vague or abstract analogical model maybe developed into something with proven empirical abilities, but we should not suggest such empirical abilities until these have been established. Furthermore, we should be particularly careful to ensure that non-modellers understand that this possibility is only a hope and not imply anything otherwise (e.g. imply that it is likely to have empirical validity). However, we suspect that in many cases this confusion goes beyond optimistic anticipation and that some modellers conflate analogical with empirical applicability, assuming that their model is basically right just because it seems that way to them. This is what we call “delusional generality” – that a researcher is under the impression that their model has a wide applicability (or potentially wide applicability) due to the attractiveness of the analogy it presents. In other words, unaware of the unconscious process of re-inventing the mapping to each target system, they imagine (without further justification) that it has some reliable empirical (or potentially empirical) generality at its core [Note 5].

Such confusion can have severe real-world consequences if a model with only analogical validity is assumed to also have some empirical reliability. Thompson (2022) discusses how abstract economic models of the cost of future climate change did affect the debate about the need for prevention and mitigation, even though they had no empirical validity. However, agent-based modellers have also made the same mistake, with a slew of completely unvalidated models about COVID affecting public debate about policy (Squazzoni et al 2021).

Conclusion

All of the above discussion raises the question of how we might achieve reliable models with even a moderate level of empirical generality in the social sciences. This is a tricky question of scientific strategy, which we are not going to answer here [Note 6]. However, we question whether the approach of making “heroic” jumps from phenomena to abstract non-empirical models on the sole basis of its plausibility to its authors will be a productive route when the target is complex phenomena, such as socio-cognitive systems (Dignum, Edmonds and Carpentras 2022). Certainly, that route has not yet been empirically demonstrated.

Whatever the best strategy is, there is a lot of theoretical modelling in the field of social simulation that assumes or implies that it is the precursor for empirical applicability and not a lot of critique about the extent of empirical success achieved. The assumption seems to be that abstract theory is the way to make progress understanding social phenomena but, as we argue here, this is largely wishful thinking – the hope that such models will turn out to have empirical generality being a delusion.  Furthermore, this approach has substantive deleterious effects in terms of encouraging an explosion of analogical models without any process of selection (Edmonds 2010). It seems that the ‘famine’ of theory about social phenomena with any significant level of generality is so severe, that many seem to give credence to models they might otherwise reject – constructing their understanding using models built on sand.

Notes

1. There is some debate about the extent to which analogical reasoning works, what kind of insights it results in and under what circumstances (Hofstede 1995). However, all we need for our purposes is that: (a) it does not reliably produce knowledge, (b) the human mind is exceptionally good at ‘fitting’ analogies to new situations (adjusting the mapping to make it ‘work’ somehow) and (c) due to this ability analogies can be far more convincing that the analogical reasoning warrants.

2. In pattern-oriented modelling (Grimm & al 2005) models are related to empirical evidence in a qualitative (pattern-based) manner, for example to some properties of a distribution of numeric outcomes. In this kind of modelling, a precise numerical correspondence is replaced by a set of qualitative correspondences in many different dimensions. In this the empirical relevance of a model is established on the basis that it is too hard to simultaneously fit a model to evidence in this way, thus ruling that out as a source of its correspondence with that evidence.

3. So-called “parsimony principles” are a very unreliable manner of evaluating competing theories on grounds other than convenience or that of using limited data to justify the values of parameters (Edmonds 2007).

4. In many models a vague argument for its plausibility is often all that is described to show that it is applicable to the cases being discussed. At least calibration demonstrates its empirical applicability, rather than simply assuming it.

5. We are applying the principle of charity here, assuming that such conflations are innocent and not deliberate. However, there is increasing pressure from funding agencies to demonstrate ‘real life relevance’ so some of these apparent confusions might be more like ‘spin’ – trying to give an impression of empirical relevance even when this is merely an aspiration, in order to suggest that their model has more significant than they have reliably established.

6. This has been discussed elsewhere, e.g. (Moss & Edmonds 2005).

Acknowledgements

Thanks to all those we have discussed these issues with, including Scott Moss (who was talking about these kinds of issue more than 30 years ago), Eckhart Arnold (who made many useful comments and whose careful examination of the lack of empirical success of some families of model demonstrates our mostly abstract arguments), Sven Banisch and other members of the ESSA special interest group on “Strongly Empirical Modelling”.

References

Arnold, E. (2013). Simulation models of the evolution of cooperation as proofs of logical possibilities. How useful are they? Ethics & Politics, XV(2), pp. 101-138. https://philpapers.org/archive/ARNSMO.pdf

Arnold, E. (2015) How Models Fail – A Critical Look at the History of Computer Simulations of the Evolution of Cooperation. In Misselhorn, C. (Ed.): Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Explanation, Implementation and Simulation, Philosophical Studies Series, Springer, pp. 261-279. https://eckhartarnold.de/papers/2015_How_Models_Fail

Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books.

Axelrod, R.  & Hamilton, W.D. (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390-1396. https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.7466396

Banisch, S., & Olbrich, E. (2019). Opinion polarization by learning from social feedback. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 43(2), 76-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2018.1517761

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© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

How Agent-based Models Offer Insights on Strategies to Mitigate Soil Degradation in North Korea: A Conversation with Dr. Yoosoon An

By Hyesop Shin1 and Yoosoon An2

  1. Interviewer: (HS), University of Glasgow, UK
  2. Interviewee: (YA), Institute for Korean Regional Studies, Seoul National University, S.Korea.

Introduction

While there’s limited knowledge about North Korea’s farming system and food chain, it’s evident that soil degradation has been an ongoing concern for the nation. To gain deeper insights, I spoke with Dr. Yoosoon An, a renowned agent-based modeller from South Korea. His PhD research delved into land degradation and declining food production in North Korea during the 1990s using Agent-Based Modelling (ABM).

HS: Can you introduce yourself?

YA: Certainly. I’m Dr. Yoosoon An, a research fellow at the Institute for Korean Regional Studies at Seoul National University. My primary research interests are North Korea, Agent-Based Modelling, and the relationship between soil health and food security. I can’t believe I’ve been modelling ABM for nearly a decade!

HS: Can you give a brief overview of your research?

YA: During my academic journey, I was deeply intrigued by issues related to land degradation and landslides. But what really caught my attention was reading about the North Korean famine in the 1990s. It’s heartbreaking to think about it. Basically, in the mid-90s, North Korea faced this huge famine. It wasn’t just because of natural disasters like droughts, but also due to the economic chaos after the Soviet Union collapsed, and some big problems in their farming systems. This just destroyed their land, and so many people almost starved. You can find more details on its Wikipedia page.

HS: What part of social simulation would you like to introduce to the community?

YA: Well for ABM right?  I’d like to introduce my PhD research that explored strategies to combat land degradation and food shortages in North Korea, with a special emphasis on the devastating famine of the 1990s (An 2020). Although there’s a clear connection between land degradation and famine, both issues are intricate and there’s limited information available, both in North Korea and globally. Through agent-based modelling (ABM), my study examined the interplay between land degradation and the decline in food production as a pivotal factor behind North Korea’s major famine in the 1990s. This “vicious cycle of land degradation”, where agricultural productivity drops because of worsening land conditions, and then the land degrades further as people intensively cultivate it to compensate, plays a central role in the broader challenges of devastation, famine, and poverty.

I utilised ABM to look at land cover changes and posited scenarios to hypothesise the potential outcomes, given alternate policies during the 1990s. Through this research, I aimed to unravel the intricacies of the relationship between land degradation and food production, providing insights that may pave the way for future policy development and intervention strategies in analogous situations.

HS: So, you’re focusing on the famine from the ’90s, but what made you decide to simulate from the 1960s?

YA: The 1960s hold significance for several key reasons. After North Korea adopted the “shared ownership system” in 1946, private land ownership was permitted. But by 1960, following the Korean War, these private lands had been integrated into collective farms. Most of today’s agricultural practices in North Korea can be traced back to that period. Furthermore, my research pointed out a noticeable increase in documentation and data collection beginning in the 1960s, underscoring its importance. From a socio-ecological perspective, I believe that the famine was a culmination of multiple intersecting crises including the one that took place in 1995. Starting the simulation from the 1960s, and tracking land cover changes up to 2020, seemed the most comprehensive approach to understanding the intricate dynamics at play.

The Agent-based Model: the “North Korean Collective Farm”

HS: Let’s delve deeper into your model. The incorporation of both land use and human agents is particularly fascinating. Could you break down this concept figure for us before we discuss the simulation?

YA: Of course. If you refer to Figure 1, it visually represents the farm’s layout and topography. We’ve chosen to represent it through simplified square and ski-slope shapes. The model also integrates the initial forest cover to demonstrate the degradation that occurred when forests were converted into farmland. When setting the model, we positioned different land uses based on the environmental adaptation strategies traditional to the Korean people. So, you’ll notice the steeper forests situated to the north, the flatter rice fields to the south, and the villages strategically placed along the mountain edge.

YA: To give you a broader picture, the model we’ve termed the “North Korean Collective Farm” (as shown in Figure 1) is a composite representation of collective farms. In this model, a collective farm is visualised as a community where several farmers either co-own their land, reflecting cooperative farming practices (akin to the “Kolkhoze” in the Soviet Union) or as part of a state-owned agricultural entity (resembling the state farm or “Sovkhozy” from the Soviet Union). North Korea embraced this model in 1954 and by 1960 had fully transitioned all its farms into this system. While there’s a dearth of comprehensive data about North Korean collective farms, a few studies offer some general insights. Typically, a farm spans between 550 and 750 hectares, roughly equivalent to ‘Ri’, North Korea’s smallest administrative unit. On average, each of these farms accommodates 300-400 households, which translates to 700-900 active workers and a total of 1900-2000 residents. These farms are further segmented into 5-10 workgroups, serving as the foundational unit for both farming activities and the distribution of yield.

HS: So, in areas where there’s a lack of specific data or where details are too diverse to be standardised, you’ve employed abstraction and summarisation. This approach to modelling seems pragmatic. When you mention setting the initial agricultural land cover to 30% rice fields and 70% other farmland, is this a reflection of the general agricultural makeup in North Korea? Would this distribution be typical or is it an average derived from various sources?

YA: Exactly. Given the limited and sometimes ambiguous data regarding North Korea, abstraction and summarization become invaluable tools for our model. The 30% rice fields and 70% other farmland distribution is a generalised representation derived from an aggregate of available North Korean land use data. While it might not precisely mirror any specific farm, it provides a reasonable approximation of the agricultural landscape across the region. This method allows us to capture the essential features and dynamics without getting mired in the specifics of any one location.

Fig 1

Figure 1. Conceptual model of the Artificial North Korean Collective Farm: integrating land use and human agents to build an agent-based model for mitigating famine risk in North Korea.

HS: Okay so let’s talk about agents. So, you’ve focused on the ‘cooperative farm’ as a representative agent in your model. This is essentially to capture the intricacies of the North Korean agricultural landscape. Can you expand a bit more on how the ‘cooperative farm’ reflects the realities of North Korean agriculture and how the LUDAS framework enhances this?

YA: Certainly. The ‘cooperative farm’ or ‘cooperative household’ is more than just a symbolic entity. It encapsulates the very essence of North Korean agricultural practices. Beginning in the 1960s and persisting to the present day, these cooperative structures are foundational to the nation’s farming landscape. Notably, their geographical boundaries often align with administrative units, making them not just agricultural but also socio-political entities. When we employ broader system dynamics models that span the entirety of North Korea, often the granularity and the subtleties can get lost. Hence, zooming into the cooperative farm level provides us with the precision and detail needed to observe intricate dynamics and interactions.

YA: Another important reason is to apply the Land-use dynamic simulator (LUDAS) framework for the case of North Korea. Now, speaking of LUDAS – this framework was chosen for its ability to seamlessly bridge biophysical and socio-economic parameters. It’s a holistic approach that factors in long-term land use/cover changes against a backdrop of varied management, planning, and policy scenarios. The strength of LUDAS lies in its capability to encapsulate the intertwined dynamics of human-environment interactions. Through a multi-agent simulation process, LUDAS effectively mirrors real-world causal mechanisms, feedback loops, and interactions. By integrating this framework into our model, we aimed to offer a comprehensive portrayal of North Korea’s agricultural landscape, rich in both depth and breadth.

HS: How do the agents decide their actions and movements?

YA: Agent decisions are based on a simple principle: when they require more food, they change their work strategy and land use. Their decisions are divided into two categories: labour allocation and land-use changes. If their labour-to-food demand ratio exceeds 1, they redirect their labour and change their land use. If this ratio is less than one, they will stick to their previous strategies.

YA: In terms of labour allocation, we assume that a worker is available 300 days per year, working 8 hours per day. The minimum labour required to cultivate an average crop on a 100m2 rice field is 36 hours per year and 48 hours for other crops. These figures are based on South Korean farming data because North Korean data is unavailable. Our model initially used 6 hours for rice and 8 hours for other crops, but these settings had no effect. As a result, we changed the hours to better reflect conditions in North Korea.

YA: Agents with a food demand ratio of less than one will allocate their labour time based on our initial assumption (if this is the first year) or on the previous year’s allocation. If the ratio exceeds one, they adjust their time allocation based on soil productivity. They will first reduce or eliminate investment in less productive lands, then devote more time to more fertile areas. The labour efficiency metric is determined by comparing the current labour time to the initially assumed time. If you have time you can take a look at Equation (3) mentioned in the paper (An & Park 2023).

HS: So, in essence, how does this environment shape the behaviour and choices of the agents?

YA: The agents operate within the landscape-environmental system, which is a subsystem influenced by the LUDAS framework. This system offers a detailed insight into land degradation and food production processes specific to North Korea. Comprising five unique submodules, it considers the biological, physical, and chemical properties of the soil, coupled with a quality index for the soil and a final metric that evaluates potential food yield by integrating these factors. All these elements together determine how agents adapt and make decisions based on the changing environment.

HS: How did you decide on a one-year interval for your simulation, especially in the context of Discrete Event Simulation?

YA: In places with a temperate to cold climate like North Korea, farming activities primarily follow an annual rhythm. Apart from this agricultural reasoning, my decision was, in part, based on the data availability. The datasets I had access to didn’t provide more detailed time frames. However, considering that many nations’ agricultural practices revolve around an annual cycle, it made sense to align both environmental and socioeconomic indicators with this timeframe. Still, I’m eager to eventually incorporate more granular data, such as monthly datasets, to explore the nuanced seasonal changes in land cover.

HS: Can you explain this loop diagram for us?

YA: The diagram presents a feedback loop related to land use happening every year in the simulation. When land productivity goes down because of overuse, there’s a greater demand for food. This greater demand then causes people to use the land more, further decreasing its quality. This continuous cycle results in ongoing harm to the land, and thus increases the food pressure for the agents also known as cooperative farms.

YA: Essentially, the loop demonstrates that “lower land productivity leads to more demand for food, which then causes even more intensive land use, further reducing the land’s quality.” In our study, we noticed that as the quality of the land decreased steadily, the decrease in the food it produced was much faster. This suggests that the effects get stronger with each cycle due to the feedback loop.

Fig 2

Figure 2. A feedback loop that connects land degradation and soil quality, subsequently inducing food pressure on agents. Within this loop, two critical points are identified: “E,” representing an early warning signal, and “T,” representing a threshold. Crossing this threshold can lead to a systematic collapse.

HS: Given the challenges associated with gathering information on North Korea, how did you ensure the validity of your model’s results?

YA: Validating the outcomes, especially for North Korea, was indeed challenging. For the environmental aspects, we relied on satellite imagery and referenced previous research data to validate our variables. When it came to the human agents, we tapped into an extensive array of literature and data on North Korean cooperative farms. We kept the behavioural rules for these agents straightforward, for instance, they’d modify their behaviours when faced with hunger, prioritise maximising land productivity, and turn to inter-mountain cultivation if they encountered continued food shortages. As for variables like labour hours and land potential, we began with South Korean data due to the absence of precise data from the North. Then, based on the outcomes of our iterative simulations, we made necessary adjustments to ensure the model aligned as closely as possible with reality.

HS: Before we dive into the findings, I just wanted to hear your opinion on Proof-Of-Concept (POC) models because you employed POC for your simulation. Can you discuss the advantages and limitations of using such models?

YA: POC models are particularly effective in scenarios with limited data availability. Despite the data constraints from North Korea, the consistency in their reports allowed me to simulate the progression of land degradation over time. POC models often have an intuitive interface, enabling easy adjustments and scenario applications. Debugging is also straightforward. However, the results can sometimes lack precise real-world applicability. Adding data or algorithms necessitates an abstraction process, which can introduce inaccuracies. For instance, equating one grid pixel to a household can oversimplify the model. Additionally, the interface might sometimes be less intuitive.

YA: I aimed to represent the food sustainability and socio-ecological systems in northeastern Asia, encompassing both China and the Korean peninsula. However, due to the lack of data for North Korea, I used a Proof-of-Concept model instead.

Findings

HS: From your simulations, what were the main insights or conclusions you drew?

YA: Our baseline simulation of the North Korean cooperative farm model painted a concerning picture. It revealed a vicious cycle where land degradation led to decreased food production, eventually culminating in a famine. Beginning the simulation from 1960, our model anticipated a famine occurring approximately 35 years later, which aligns with the real-world famine of 1995 in North Korea. You can take a look at Figure 3.

YA: On introducing the additional food supply scenario, we observed a delay in the onset of the famine. This finding highlights the significance of addressing the isolated nature of North Korea when aiming to prevent famine. However, it’s imperative to understand that merely making the food system more accessible isn’t a silver bullet. Comprehensive solutions must also focus on various other interventions.

HS: Based on your research, what are the potential solutions to address the future food crisis in North Korea?

YA: Our model highlights a feedback loop that intensifies food scarcity as land quality degrades. One approach we tested was enhancing external food supply. The results showed that this strategy can slow down the threat of famine, but it doesn’t completely break the loop. Even with more food coming in, the core issue—deteriorating land quality—remains unresolved.

YA: Several alternatives to address this feedback loop include adopting sustainable agricultural practices, supplementing with external energy sources, or restructuring North Korea’s collective farming system. We’re still working on modelling these solutions effectively.

YA: Historically, the Korean Peninsula faced severe famines in the 1600s, attributed to factors like climatic changes, deforestation, and diplomatic isolation. These circumstances resemble North Korea’s recent famine in the 1990s. The underlying problem in both cases is a cycle where declining land productivity demands more food production, further harming the land.

YA: Considering this historical context, it’s possible to argue that the Korean Peninsula, by itself, might not sustain its population and environment without external help. Supplying food and energy from outside might be more of a temporary solution, giving us time to seek more permanent ones.

YA: To genuinely address the land and food problem, we need to explore and test alternatives further. This could involve sustainable farming methods, efficient agricultural systems, and broader diplomatic actions for international trade and cooperation. The ultimate goal is a sustainable future for both North Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula.

Fig 3

Figure 3. Summary of the results for replicability of the great famine in the 1990s: (a) Mean and standard deviation trends of land-use change (left) and food yield and soil quality (right); (b) Examples of land-use change in the model (NetLogo Interface)

Other Stories

HS: Can you share more stories from your research journey?

YA: When starting my PhD, the initial idea was to build upon my Master’s thesis about the North Korean land degradation-famine model, known as the “Pyong-an-do Model”. To note, Pyong-an-do (pronounced as doe a deer) is a province that encompasses Pyongyang, the capital, and the surrounding regions. However, data limitations made progress challenging. Around mid-2018, a visiting professor in ecological modelling suggested simplifying the model, sparking the concepts of “creating a virtual North Korea” and “establishing a virtual collective farm.”

YA: By July 2018, with a basic model ready, I applied to present at the Computational Social Science (CSS) 2018 conference. Unbeknownst to me, a full paper was required beyond just an abstract. Thankfully, the Computational Social Science Society of the Americas (CSSSA) provided an extra two weeks for submission due to the intriguing nature of the topic. That intense fortnight saw a majority of my thesis chapter being written!

YA: During the conference, a grad student from India pointed out that the results from my model, which predicted the collapse of North Korea’s farm system in around 35 years, had some eerie similarities to what happened in India and Ghana after the British messed around with their agriculture. They faced famines about 30-40 years later. He even mentioned maybe I should look into making a more general famine model, and brought up Dr. Amartya Sen’s thoughts on freedom, inequality, and development. I thought it was a cool idea, but more like a long-term idea for me.

YA: Fast forward to early 2021, I conducted interviews with experts and North Korean defectors about my model’s findings. While some feedback was beyond my thesis’ scope or challenging to incorporate, a comment from a defector with agricultural expertise stood out. He mentioned that, contrary to criticisms, the model’s depiction of nearly abandoned agricultural lands in North Korea during the early 1990s mirrored reality, further validating the accuracy of my work.

HS: For those interested in delving deeper, where can they access your model?

YA: You can find the model on my Github account (An 2023). Additionally, I’m considering publishing it on comses.net for broader accessibility and collaboration.

Date of Interview: Feb 2023, Translated into English: Sep 2023.

References

An. Y(2020), A Study on Land Degradation and Declining Food Production based on the Concept of Complex Adaptive System: Focusing on the North Korean Famine in the 1990s (Doctoral dissertation), Seoul National University (in Korean with English Abstract). link

An, Y and Park S.J (2023), Developing an Agent-Based Model to Mitigate Famine Risk in North Korea: Insights from the “Artificial North Korean Collective Farm” Model, Land, 12(4), 735 https://doi.org/10.3390/land12040735

An, Y (2023) Artificial_NK_cooperative_farm_model: https://github.com/newsoon8/Artificial_NK_cooperative_farm_model


Shin, H. & An, Y. (2023) How Agent-based Models Offer Insights on Strategies to Mitigate Soil Degradation in North Korea: A Conversation with Dr. Yoosoon An. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 25 Oct 2023. https://rofasss.org/2023/10/25/Interview-Yoosoon-An


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Exascale computing and ‘next generation’ agent-based modelling

By Gary Polhill, Alison Heppenstall, Michael Batty, Doug Salt, Ricardo Colasanti, Richard Milton and Matt Hare

Introduction

In the past decade we have seen considerable gains in the amount of data and computational power that are available to us as scientific researchers.  Whilst the proliferation of new forms of data can present as many challenges as opportunities (linking data sets, checking veracity etc.), we can now begin to construct models that are capable of answering ever more complex and interrelated questions.  For example, what happens to individual health and the local economy if we pedestrianize a city centre?  What is the impact of increasing travel costs on the price of housing? How can we divert economic investment to places in economic decline from prosperous cities and regions. These advances are slowly positioning agent-based modelling to support decision-makers to make informed evidence-based decisions.  However, there is still a lack of ABMs being used outside of academia and policy makers find it difficult to mobilise and apply such tools to inform real world problems: here we explore the background in computing that helps address the question why such models are so underutilised in practice.

Whilst reaching a level of maturity (defined as being an accepted tool) within the social sciences, agent-based modelling still has several methodological barriers to cross.  These were first highlighted by Crooks et al. (2008) and revisited by Heppenstall et al. (2020) and include robust validation, elicitation of behaviour from data and scaling up.  Whilst other disciplines, such as meteorology, are able to conduct large numbers of simulations (ensemble modelling) using high-performance computing, there is a relative absence of this capability within agent-based modelling. Moreover, many different kinds of agent-based models are being devised, and key issues concern the number and type of agents and these are reflected in the whole computational context in which such models are developed. Clearly there is potential for agent-based modelling to establish itself as a robust policy tool, but this requires access to large-scale computing.

Exascale high-performance computing is defined with respect to speed of calculation with orders of magnitude defined as 10^18 (a billion-billion) floating point operations per second (flops). That is fast enough to calculate the ratios of the ages of each of every possible pair of people in China in roughly a second. By comparison, modern-day personal computers are around 10^9 flops (gigascale) – a billion times slower. The same rather pointless calculation of age ratios of the Chinese would take just over thirty years on a standard laptop at the time of writing (2023). Though agent-based modellers are more interested in instructions incorporating the rules operated by each agent executed per second than in floating-point operations, the speed of the two is approximately the same.

Anecdotally, the majority of simulations of agent-based models are on personal computers operating on the desktop. However, there are examples of the use of high-performance computing environments such as computing clusters (terascale) and cloud services such as Microsoft’s Azure, Amazon’s AWS or Google Cloud (tera- to peta-scale). High-performance computing provides the capacity to do more of what we already do (more runs for calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis) and/or at a larger scale (regional or sub-national scale rather than local scale) with the number of agents scaled accordingly. As a rough guide, however, since terascale computing is a million times slower than exascale computing, an experiment that currently takes a few days or weeks in a high-performance computing environment could be completed in a fraction of a second at exascale.

We are all familiar with poor user interface design in everyday computing, and in particular the frustration of waiting for the hourglasses, spinning wheels and progress bars to finish so that we can get on with our work. In fact, the ‘Doherty Threshold’ (Yablonski 2020) stipulates 400ms interaction time between human action and computer response for best productivity. If going from 10^9 to 10^18 flops is simply a case of multiplying the speed of computation by a billion, the Doherty threshold is potentially feasible with exascale computing when applied to simulation experiments that now require very long wait times for completion.

The scale of performance of exascale computers means that there is scope to go beyond doing-more-of-what-we-already-do to thinking more deeply about what we could achieve with agent-based modelling. Could we move past some of these methodological barriers that are characteristic of agent-based modelling? What could we achieve if we had appropriate software support, and how this would affect the processes and practices by which agent-based models are built? Could we move agent-based models to having the same level of ‘robustness’ as climate models, for example? We can conceive of a productivity loop in which an empirical agent-based model is used for sequential experimentation with continual adaptation and change, continued experiment with perhaps a new model emerging from these workflows to explore tangential issues. But currently we need to have tools that help us build empirical agent-based models much more rapidly, and critically, to find, access and preprocess empirical data that the model will use for initialisation, then finding and affirming parameter values.

The ExAMPLER project

The ExAMPLER (Exascale Agent-based Modelling for PoLicy Evaluation in Real-time) project is an eighteen-month project funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council to explore the software, data and institutional requirements to support agent-based modelling at exascale.

With high-performance computing use not being commonplace in the agent-based modelling community, we are interested in finding out what the state-of-the-art is in high-performance computing use by agent-based modellers, undertaking a systematic literature review to assess the community’s ‘exascale-readiness’. This is not just a question of whether the community has the necessary technical skills to use the equipment. It is also a matter that covers whether the hardware is appropriate to the computational demands that agent-based modellers have, whether the software in which agent-based models are built can take advantage of the hardware, and whether the institutional processes by which agent-based modellers access high-performance computing – especially with respect to information requested of applicants – is aware of their needs.

We will then benchmark the state-of-the-art against high-performance computing use in other domains of research: ecology and microsimulation, which are comparable to agent-based social simulation (ABSS); and fields such as transportation, land use and urban econometric  modelling that are  not directly comparable to ABSS, but have similar computational challenges (e.g. having to simulate many interactions, needing to explore a vast uncharted parameter space, containing multiple qualitatively different outcomes from the same initial conditions, and so on). Ecology might not simulate agents with decision-making algorithms as computationally demanding as some of those used by agent-based modellers of social systems, while a crude characterisation of microsimulation work is that it does not simulate interactions among heterogeneous agents, which affects the parallelisation of simulating them. Land use and transport models usually rely on aggregates of agents but increasingly there are being disaggregated to finer and fine spatial units with these units themselves being treated more like agents. The ‘discipline-to-be-decided’ might have a community with generally higher technical computing skills than would be expected among social scientists. Benchmarking would allow us to gain better insights into the specific barriers faced by social scientists in accessing high-performance computing.

Two other strands of work in ExAMPLER feature significant engagement with the agent-based modelling community. The project’s imaginary starting point is a computer powerful enough to experiment with an agent-based model which run in fractions of a second. With a pre-existing agent-based model, we could use such a computer in a one-day workshop to enable a creative discussion with decision-makers about how to handle problems and policies associated with an emerging crisis. But what if we had the tools at our disposal to gather and preprocess data and build models such that these activities could also be achievable in the same day? or even the same hour? Some of our land use and transportation models are already moving in this direction (Horni, Nagel, and Axhausen, 2016). Agent-based modelling would thus become a social activity that facilitates discussion and decision-making that is mindful of complexity and cascading consequences. The practices and procedures associated with building an agent-based model would then have evolved significantly from what they are now, as have the institutions built around accessing and using high-performance computing.

The first strand of work co-constructs with the agent-based modelling community various scenarios by which agent-based modelling is transformed by the dramatic improvements in computational power that exascale computing entails. These visions will be co-constructed primarily through workshops, the first of which is being held at the Social Simulation Conference in Glasgow – a conference that is well-attended by the European (and wider international) agent-based social simulation community. However, we will also issue a questionnaire to elicit views from the wider community of those who cannot attend one of our events. There are two purposes to these exercises: to understand the requirements of the community and their visions for the future, but also to advertise the benefits that exascale computing could have.

In a second series of workshops, we will develop a roadmap for exascale agent-based modelling that identifies the institutional, scientific and infrastructure support needed to achieve the envisioned exascale agent-based modelling use-cases. In essence, what do we need to have in place to make exascale a reality for the everyday agent-based modeller? This activity is underpinned by training ExAMPLER’s research team in the hardware, software and algorithms that can be used to achieve exascale computation more widely. That knowledge, together with the review of the state-of-the-art in high-performance computing use with agent-based models, can be used to identify early opportunities for the community to make significant gains (Macal, and North, 2008)

Discussion

Exascale agent-based modelling is not simply a case of providing agent-based modellers with usernames and passwords on an exascale computer and letting them run their models on it. There are many institutional, scientific and infrastructural barriers that need to be addressed.

On the scientific side, exascale agent-based modelling could be potentially revolutionary in transforming the practices, methods and audiences for agent-based modelling. As a highly diverse community, methodological development is challenged both by the lack of opportunity to make it happen, and by the sheer range of agent-based modelling applications. Too much standardization and ritualized behaviour associated with ‘disciplining’ agent-based modelling risks some of the creative benefits of having the cross-disciplinary discussions that agent-based modelling enables us to have. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that off-the-shelf methods for designing, implementing and assessing models are ill-suited to agent-based modelling, or – especially in the case of the last of these – fail to do it justice (Polhill and Salt 2017, Polhill et al. 2019). Scientific advancement in agent-based modelling is predicated on having the tools at our disposal to tell the whole story of its benefits, and enabling non-agent-based modelling colleagues to understand how to work with the ABM community.

Hence, hardware is only a small part of the story of the infrastructure supporting exascale agent-based modelling. Exascale computers are built using GPUs (Graphical Processing Units) – which, bluntly-speaking, are specialized computing engines for performing matrix calculations and ‘drawing millions of triangles as quickly as possible’ – they are, in any case, different from CPU-based computing. In Table 4 of Kravari and Bassiliades’ (2015) survey of agent-based modelling platforms, only two of the 24 platforms reviewed (Cormas – Bommel et al. 2016 and GAMA – Taillandier et al. 2019) are not listed as involving Java and/or the Java Virtual Machine. (As it turns out, GAMA does use Java.) TornadoVM (Papadimitriou et al. 2019) is one tool allowing Java Virtual Machines to run on GPUs. Even if we can then run NetLogo on a GPU, specialist GPU-based agent-based modelling platforms such as Richmond et al.’s (2010, 2022) FLAME GPU may be preferable in order to make best use of the highly parallelized computing environment on GPUs.

Such software simply achieves getting an agent-based model running on an exascale computer. Realizing some of the visions of future exascale-enabled agent-based modelling means rather more in the way of software support. For example, the one-day workshop in which an agent-based modelling is co-constructed with stakeholders asks either a great deal of the developers in terms of building a bespoke application in tens of minutes, or many stakeholders trusting pre-constructed modular components that can be brought together rapidly using a specialist software tool.

As has been noted (e.g. Alessa et al. 2006, para 3.4), agent-based modelling is already challenging for social scientists without programming expertise, and GPU programming is a highly specialized domain in the world of software environments. Exascale computing intersects GPU programming with high-performance computing; issues with the ways in which high-performance computing clusters are typically administered make access to them a significant obstacle for agent-based modellers (Polhill 2022). There are therefore institutional barriers that need to be broken down for the benefits of exascale agent-based modelling to be realized in a community primarily interested in the dynamics of social and/or ecological complexity, and rather less in the technology that enables them to pursue that interest. ExAMPLER aims to provide us with a voice that gets our requirements heard so that we are not excluded from taking best advantage of advanced development in computing hardware.

Acknowledgements

The ExAMPLER project is funded by the EPSRC under grant number EP/Y008839/1.  Further information is available at: https://exascale.hutton.ac.uk

References

Alessa, L. N., Laituri, M. and Barton, M. (2006) An “all hands” call to the social science community: Establishing a community framework for complexity modeling using cyberinfrastructure. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9 (4), 6. https://www.jasss.org/9/4/6.html

Bommel, P., Becu, N., Le Page, C. and Bousquet, F. (2016) Cormas: An agent-based simulation platform for coupling human decisions with computerized dynamics. In Kaneda, T., Kanegae, H., Toyoda, Y. and Rizzi, P. (eds.) Simulation and Gaming in the Network Society. Translational Systems Sciences 9, pp. 387-410. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-0575-6_27

Crooks, A. T., C. J. E. Castle, and M. Batty. (2008). “Key Challenges in Agent-Based Modelling for Geo-spatial Simulation.” Computers, Environment and Urban Systems  32(6),  417– 30.

Heppenstall A, Crooks A, Malleson N, Manley E, Ge J, Batty M. (2020). Future Developments in Geographical Agent-Based Models: Challenges and Opportunities. Geographical Analysis. 53(1): 76 – 91 doi:10.1111/gean.12267

Horni, A, Nagel, K and Axhausen, K W. (eds)(2016) The Multi-Agent Transport Simulation MATSim, Ubiquity Press, London, 447–450

Kravari, K. and Bassiliades, N. (2015) A survey of agent platforms. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 18 (1), 11. https://www.jasss.org/18/1/11.html

Macal, C. M., and North, M. J. (2008) Agent-Based Modeling And Simulation for EXASCALE Computing, http://www.scidac.org

Papadimitriou, M., Fumero, J., Stratikopoulos, A. and Kotselidis, C. (2019) Towards prototyping and acceleration of Java programs onto Intel FPGAs. Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE 27th Annueal International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM). doi:10.1109/FCCM.2019.00051

Polhill, G. (2022) Antisocial simulation: using shared high-performance computing clusters to run agent-based models. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 14 Dec 2022. https://rofasss.org/2022/12/14/antisoc-sim

Polhill, G. and Salt, D. (2017) The importance of ontological structure: why validation by ‘fit-to-data’ is insufficient. In Edmonds, B. and Meyer, R. (eds.) Simulating Social Complexity (2nd edition), pp. 141-172. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_8

Polhill, J. G., Ge, J., Hare, M. P., Matthews, K. B., Gimona, A., Salt, D. and Yeluripati, J. (2019) Crossing the chasm: a ‘tube-map’ for agent-based simulation of policy scenarios in spatially-distributed systems. Geoinformatica 23, 169-199. doi:10.1007/s10707-018-00340-z

Richmond, P., Chisholm, R., Heywood, P., Leach, M. and Kabiri Chimeh, M. (2022) FLAME GPU (2.0.0-rc). Zenodo. doi:10.5281/zenodo.5428984

Richmond, P., Walker, D., Coakley, S. and Romano, D. (2010) High performance cellular level agent-based simulation with FLAME for the GPU. Briefings in Bioinformatics 11 (3), 334-347. doi:10.1093/bib/bbp073

Taillandier, P., Gaudou, B., Grignard, A.,Huynh, Q.-N., Marilleau, N., P. Caillou, P., Philippon, D. and Drogoul, A. (2019). Building, composing and experimenting complex spatial models with the GAMA platform. Geoinformatica 23 (2), 299-322, doi:10.1007/s10707-018-00339-6

Yablonski, J. (2020) Laws of UX. O’Reilly. https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/laws-of-ux/9781492055303/


Polhill, G., Heppenstall, A., Batty, M., Salt, D., Colasanti, R., Milton, R. and Hare, M. (2023) Exascale computing and ‘next generation’ agent-based modelling. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 9 Mar 2023. https://rofasss.org/2023/09/29/exascale-computing-and-next-gen-ABM


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Agent-based Modelling as a Method for Prediction for Complex Social Systems – a review of the special issue

International Journal of Social Research Methodology, Volume 26, Issue 2.

By Oswaldo Terán

Escuela de Ciencias Empresariales, Universidad Católica del Norte, Coquimbo, Chile

This special issue appeared following a series of articles in RofASSS regarding the polemic around Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) prediction (https://rofasss.org/tag/prediction-thread/).  As expected, the articles in the special issue complement and expand upon the initial RofASSS’s discussion.

The goal of the special issue is to explore a wide range of positions regarding ABM prediction, encompassing methodological, epistemic and pragmatic issues. Contributions go from moderately sceptic and pragmatic positions to strongly sceptic positions. Moderately sceptic views argue that ABM can cautiously be employed for prediction, sometimes as a complement to other approaches, acknowledging its somewhat peripheral role in social research. Conversely, strongly sceptic positions contend that, in general, ABM can not be utilized for prediction. Several factors are instrumental in distinguishing and understanding these positions with respect to ABM prediction, especially the following:

  • the conception of prediction.
  • the complexity of modelled systems and models: this encompasses factors such as multiple views (or perspectives), uncertainty, auto-organization, self-production, emergence, structural change, and data incompleteness. These complexities are associated with the limitations of our language and tools to comprehend and symmetrically model complex systems.

Considering these factors, we will summarize the diverse positions presented in this special issue. Then, we will delve into the notions of prediction and complexity and briefly situate each position within the framework provided by these definitions

Elsebroich and Polhill (2023) (Editorial) summarizes the diverse positions in the special issue regarding prediction, categorizing them into three groups: 1) Positive, a position that assumes that “all we need for prediction is to have the right data,  methods and mechanism” (p. 136); 2) pragmatic, a position advocate to for cautious use of ABM to attempt prediction, often to compliment other approaches and avoid exclusive reliance on them; and 3) sceptic, a position arguing that ABM can not be used for prediction but can serve other purposes.  The authors place this discussion in a broader context, considering other relevant papers on ABM prediction. The authors acknowledge the challenge of prediction in complex systems, citing factors such as multiple perspectives, asynchronous agent actions, emergence, nonlinearity, non-ergodicity, evolutionary dynamics and heterogeneity. They indicate that some of these factors are well managed in ABM, but not others, noticeably “multiple perspectives/views”. Uncertainty is another critical element affecting ABM prediction, along with the relationship between prediction and explanation. The authors proved a summary of the debate surrounding the possibilities of prediction and its relation with explanation, incorporating insightful views from external sources (e.g., Thompson & Derr, 2009; Troitzsch, 2009). They also highlight recent developments in this debate, noticing that ABM has evolved into a more empirical and data-driven approach, deeply focused on modelling complex social and ecological systems, including Geographical Information Systems data and real time data integration, leading to a more contentious discussion regarding empirical data-driven ABM prediction.

Chattoe-Brown (2023) supports the idea that ABM prediction is possible. He argues for the utility of using AMB not only to predict real world outcomes but also to predict models. He also advocates for using prediction for predictive failure and assessing predictions. His notion of prediction finds support on by key elements of prediction in social science derived from real research across disciplines. For instance, the need of adopting a conceptual approach to enhance our comprehension of the various facets of prediction, the functioning of diverse prediction approaches, and the need for clear thinking about temporal logic. Chattoe-Brown argues that he attempts to make prediction intelligible rather than seen if it is successful. He support the idea that ABM prediction is useful for coherent social science. He contrasts ABM to other modelling methods that predict on trend data alone, underscoring the advantages of ABM. From his position, ABM prediction can add value to other research, taking a somewhat secondary role.

Dignum (2023) defends the ability of ABM to make prediction while distinguishing the usefulness of a prediction from the truth of a prediction. He argues in favour of limited prediction in specific cases, especially when human behaviour is involved. He shows prediction alongside explanations of the predicted behaviour, which arise under specific constrains that define particular scenarios. His view is moderately positive, suggesting that prediction is possible under certain specific conditions, including a stable environment and sufficient available data.

Carpentras and Quayle (2023) call for improved agent specification to reduce distortions when using psychometric instruments, particularly in measurements of political opinion within ABM. They contend that the quality of prediction and validation depends on the scale of the system but acknowledges the challenges posed by the high complexity of the human brain, which is central to their study. Furthermore, they raise concerns about representativeness, especially considering the discrepancy between certain theoretical frameworks (e.g., opinion dynamics) and survey data.

Anzola and García-Díaz (2023) advocate for better criteria to judge prediction and a more robust framework for the practice of prediction to better coordinate efforts within the research community (helping to better contextualize needs and expectations). They hold a somewhat sceptic position, suggesting that prediction typically serve an instrumental role in scientific practices, subservient to other epistemic goals.

Elsenbroich and Badham (2023) adopt a somewhat negative and critical stance toward using ABM for prediction, asserting that ABM can improve forecasting but not provide definite predictions of specific future events. ABM can only generate coherent extrapolations from a certain initialization of the ABM and a set of assumptions. They argue that ABM generates “justified stories” based on internal coherence, mechanisms and consistency  with empirical evidence, but these can not be confused with precise predictions. They ask for the combined support of ABM on theoretical developments and external data.

Edmonds (2023) is the most sceptical regarding the use of ABM for prediction, contending that the motivation for prediction in ABM is a desire without evidence of its achievability. He highlights inherent reasons for preventing prediction in complex social and ecological systems, including incompleteness, chaos, context specificity, and more. In his perspective, it is essential to establish the distinction between prediction and explanation. He advocates for recognizing the various potential applications of AMB beyond prediction, such as description, explanation, analogy, and more. For Edmonds, prediction should entail generating data that is unknown to the modellers. To address the ongoing debate and the weakness of the practices in ABM prediction, Edmonds proposes a process of iterative and independent verification. However, this approach faces limitations due to the incomplete understanding of the underlying process that should be included into the requirement for high-quality, relevant data. Despite these challenges, Edmonds suggest that prediction could prove valuable in meta-modelling, particularly to comprehend better our own simulation models.

The above summarized diverse positions on ABM prediction within the reviewed articles can be better understood through the lenses of Troitzsch’s notion of prediction and McNabb’s descriptions of complex and complicated systems. Troitzsch (2009) distinguishes the difference between prediction and explanation by using three possible conceptions of predictions. The typical understanding of ABM prediction closely aligns with Troitzsch’s third definition of prediction, which answer to the following question:

Which state will the target system reach in the near future, again given parameters and previous states which may or may not have been precisely measured?

The answer to this question results in a prediction, which can be either stochastic or deterministic. In our view, explanations encompass broader range of statements than predictions. An explanation entails a wider scope, including justifications, descriptions, and reasons for various real or hypothetical scenarios. Explanation is closely tied to a fundamental aspect of human communication capacity signifying the act of making something plain, clear or comprehensible by elaborating its meaning. But, what precisely does it expand or elaborate?. It expands a specific identification, opinion, judgement or belief. In general, a prediction implies a much narrower and more precise statement than an explanation, often hinting at possibilities regarding future events.

Several factors influence complex systems, including self-organization, multiple views, and dynamic complexity as defined by McNabb (2023a-c). McNabb contend that in complex systems the interaction among components and between the system as a whole and its environment transcend the insights derived from a mere components analysis. Two central characteristics of complex systems are self-organization and emergence. It is important to distinguish between complex systems and complicated systems: complex systems are organic systems (comprising biological, psychological and social systems), whereas complicated systems are mechanical systems (e.g., air planes, a computer, and ABM models). The challenge of agency arises primarily in complex systems, marked by highly uncertain behaviour. Relationships within self-organized system exhibit several noteworthy properties, although, given the need for a concise discussion regarding ABM prediction, we will consider here only a few of them (McNabb, 2023a-c):

  1. Multiple views,
  2. Dynamic interactions (connexion among components changes over time),
  3. Non-linear interaction (small causes can lead to unpredictable effects),
  4. The system lacks static equilibrium (instead, it maintains a dynamic equilibrium and remains unstable),
  5. Understanding the current state necessitates examining Its history (a diachronic, not synchronic study, is essential)

Given the possibility of multiple views, a complex systems are prone to significant structural change due to  dynamic and non-linear interactions, dynamic equilibrium  and diachronic evolution. Additionally, the probability of possessing both the right change mechanism (the logical process) and complete data (addressing the challenge of data incompleteness) required to initialize the model and establish necessary assumptions is excessively low. Consequently, predicting outcomes in complex systems (defined as organic systems) whether using AMB or alternative mechanisms, becomes nearly impossible. If such prediction does occur, it typically happens under highly specific conditions, such as within a brief time frame and controlled settings, often amounting to a form of coincidental success. Only after the expected event or outcomes materializes can we definitely claim that it was predicted. Although prediction remains a challenging endeavour in complex systems, it remains viable in complicated systems. In complicated systems, prediction serves as an answer to Troitzsch’s aforementioned question.

Taking into account Troitzsch’s notion of prediction and McNabb’s ideas on complex systems and complicated systems, let’s briefly revisit the various positions presented in this special issue.

Chattoe-Brown (2023) suggests using models to predict models. Models are considered complicated rather than complex systems, so it this case, we would be predicting a complicated system rather than a complex one. This represents a significant reduction.

Dignum (2023) argues that prediction is possible in cases where there is a stable environment (conditions) and sufficient available data. However, this generally is not the case, making it challenging to meet the requirements for prediction when considering complex (organic) systems.

Carpentras and Quayle (2023) themselves acknowledge the difficulties of prediction in ABM when studying issues related to psychological systems involving psychometric measures, which are a type of organic system, aligning with our argument.

Elsenbroich and Badham (2023), Elsebroich and Polhill (2023), and Edmonds (2023) maintain a strongly sceptic position regarding ABM prediction. They argue that AMBs yield coherent extrapolations based on a specific initialization of the model and a set of assumptions, but these extrapolations are not necessarily grounded in reality. According to them, complex systems exhibit properties such as information incompleteness, multiple perspectives, emergence, evolutionary dynamics, and context specificity. In this respect, their position aligns with the stance we are presenting here.

Finally, Anzola and García-Díaz (2023) advocate for a more robust framework for prediction and recognizes the ongoing debate on prediction, an stance that closely resonates with our own.

In conclusion, Troitzsch notion of prediction and McNabb descriptions of complex systems and complicated systems have helped us better understand the diverse positions on ABM prediction in the reviewed issue. This exemplifies how a good conceptual framework, in this
case offered by appropriate notions of prediction and complexity, can
contribute to reducing the controversy surrounding ABM prediction.

References

Anzola D. and García-Díaz C. (2023). What kind of prediction? Evaluating different facets of prediction in agent-based social simulation International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 171-191. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137919

Carpentras D. and Quayle M. (2023). The psychometric house-of-mirrors: the effect of measurement distortions on agent-based models’ predictions. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 215-231. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137938

Chattoe-Brown E. (2023). Is agent-based modelling the future of prediction International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 143-155. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137923

Dignum F. (2023). Should we make predictions based on social simulations?}. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137925

Edmonds B. (2023). The practice and rhetoric of prediction – the case in agent-based modelling. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 157-170. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137921

Edmonds, B., Polhill, G., & Hales, D. (2019). Predicting Social Systems – A Challenge. https://rofasss.org/2019/11/04/predicting-social-systems-a-challenge/

Elsenbroich C. and Polhill G. (2023) Editorial: Agent-based modelling as a method for prediction in complex social systems. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26/2, 133-142. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2023.2152007

Elsenbroich C. and Badham J. (2023). Negotiating a Future that is not like the Past. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 26(2), pp. 207-213. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2137935

McNabb D. (2023a, September 20). El Paradigma de la complejidad (1/3) [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Uly1n6tOOlA&ab_channel=DarinMcNabb

McNabb D. (2023b, September 20). El Paradigma de la complejidad (2/3) [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PT2m9lkGhvM&ab_channel=DarinMcNabb

McNabb D. (2023c, September 20). El Paradigma de la complejidad (3/3) [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=25f7l6jzV5U&ab_channel=DarinMcNabb

Troitzsch, K. G. (2009). Not all explanations predict satisfactorily, and not all good predictions explain. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 12(1), 10. https://www.jasss.org/12/1/10.html


Terán, O. (2023) Agent-based Modelling as a Method for Prediction for Complex Social Systems - a review of the special issue. Review of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 28 Sep 2023. https://rofasss.org/2023/09/28/review-ABM-for-prediction


© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

Policy modelling requires a multi-scale, multi-criteria and diverse-framing approach

Lessons from a session at SocSimFest 2023

By Gary Polhill and Juliette Rouchier

Bruce Edmonds organized a stimulating session at the SocSimFest held 15-16 March 2023. Entitled, “How to do wrong using Social Simulation – as a result of arrogance, laziness or ill intent.” One of the presentations (Rouchier 2023) covered the modelling used to justify lockdowns in various countries. This talk concentrated on the harms lockdowns caused and suggested that they were unnecessary; a discourse that is not the most present in the media and takes an alternative view to the idea that a scientific consensus exists in real-time and could lead to the best decision. There was some ‘vigorous’ debate afterwards, but here we expand on an important point that came out of that debate: Modelling the effects of Covid to inform policy on managing the disease requires much more than epidemiological modelling. We might speculate, then, whether in general, modelling for policy intervention means ensuring greater coverage of the wider system than might be deemed strictly necessary for the immediate policy question in hand. Though such speculation has apparent consequences for model complicatedness that go beyond Sun et al.’s (2016) ‘Medawar zone’ for empirical ABM, there is an interpretation of this requirement for extended coverage that is also compatible with preferences for simpler models.

Going beyond the immediate case of Covid would require the identification of commonalities in the processes of decision making that could be extrapolated to other situations. We are less interested in that here than making the case that simulation for policy analysis in the context of Covid entails greater coverage of the system than might be expected given the immediate questions in hand. The expertise of Rouchier means our focus is primarily on the experience of Covid in France. Generalisation of the principle to wider coverage beyond this case is a matter of conjecture that we propose making.

Handling Covid: an evaluation that is still in progress

Whether governments were right or wrong to implement lockdowns of varying severity is a matter that will be for historians to debate. During that time various researchers developed models, including agent-based models, that were used to advise policymakers on handling an emergency situation predicated on higher rates of mortality and hospitalisation.[1] Assessing the effectiveness of the lockdowns empirically would require us to be able to collect data from parallel universes in which they were not implemented. The fact that we cannot do this leaves us, as Rouchier pointed out, either comparing outcomes with models’ predictions – which is problematic if the models are not trusted – or comparing outcomes across countries with different lockdown policies – which has so far been inconclusive even if it weren’t problematic because of differences in culture and geography from one nation to another. Such comparison will nevertheless be the most fruitful in time, although the differences of implementation among countries will doubtless induce long discussions about the most important factors to consider for defining relevant Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI).[2]

The effects of the lockdowns themselves on people’s mental and physical health, child development, and on the economy and working practices, are also the subject of emerging data post-lockdown. Some of these consequences have been severe – not least for the individuals concerned. Though not germane to the central argument of this brief document, it is worth noting that the same issue with unobservable parallel universes means that scientific rather than historical assessment of whether these outcomes are better or worse than any outcomes for those individuals and society at large in the absence of lockdowns is also impossible.

For our purposes, the most significant aspect of this second point is that the discussion has arisen after the epidemic emergency: First, it is noteworthy that these matters could perfectly well have been considered in models during the crisis. Indeed, contrasting the positive effect (saving lives or saving a public service) with negative effects (children’s withdrawal from education,[3] increasing psychological distress, not to mention domestic abuse – Usta et al. 2021) is typically what cost-benefit analysis, based on multi-criteria modelling, is supposed to elicit (Roy, 1996). In modelling for public policy decision-making, it is particularly clear that there is no universally ‘superior’ or ‘optimum’ indicator to be used for comparing options; but several indicators to evaluate diverse alternative policies. A discussion about the best decision for a population has to be based on the best description of possible policies and their evaluations according to the chosen indicators (Pluchinotta et al., 2022). This means that a hierarchy of values has to be made explicit to justify the hierarchy of most important indicators. During the Covid crisis one question that could have been asked (should it not have been) is: who is the most vulnerable population to protect? Is it old people because of disease or young people because of potential threats to their future chances in life?

Second, it is clear that this answer could vary in time with information and the dynamics of variant of Covid. For example, as soon as Omicron was announced by South Africa’s doctors, it was said to be less dangerous than earlier variants.[4] In that sense, the discussion of balancing priorities, in a dynamic way, in this historical period is very typical of what could also be central in other public discussions where the whole population is facing a highly uncertain future, and where the evolution of knowledge is rapid. But it is difficult to know in advance which indicators should be considered since some signals can be very weak at some point in time, but then be confirmed as highly relevant later on – essentially this is the problem of the omitted-variable bias.

The discussion about risks to mental health was vivid in 2020 already: some psychologists were soon showing the risk for people with mental health issues or women with violent husbands;[5] while the discussion about effects on children started early in 2020 (Singh et al., 2020). However this issue only started to be considered publicly by the French government a year and a half later. One interpretation of the time differential is that the signal seemed too weak for non-specialists early on, when the specialists had already seen the disturbing signs.

In science, we have no definitive rule to decide when a weak signal at present will later turn out to be truly significant. Rather, it is ‘society’ as a whole that decides on the value of different indicators (sometimes only with the wisdom of hindsight) and scientists should provide knowledge on these. This goes back to classical questions of hierarchy of values about the diverse stakes people hold in questions that recur perennially in decision science.

Modelling for policy making: tension between complexity and elegance?

Edmonds (2022) presented a paper at SSC 2022 outlining four ‘levels’ of rigour needed when conducting social simulation exercises, reserving the highest level for using agent-based models to inform public policy. Page limitations for conference submissions meant he was unable to articulate in the paper as full a list of the stipulations for rigour in the fourth level as he was for the other three. However, Rouchier’s talk at the SocSimFest brought into sharp focus that at least one of those stipulations is that models of public policy should always have broader coverage of the system than is strictly necessary for the immediate question in hand. This has the strange-seeming consequence that exclusively epidemiological models are inadequate to the task of modelling how a contagious illness should be controlled. For any control measure that is proposed, such a stipulation entails that the model be capable of exploring not only the effect on disease spread, but also potential wider effects of relevance to societal matters generally in the domain of other government departments: such as, energy, the environment, business, justice, transportation, welfare, agriculture, immigration, and international relations.

The conjecture that for any modelling challenge in complex or wicked systems, thorough policy analysis entails broader system coverage than the immediate problem in hand (KIDS-like – see Edmonds & Moss 2005), is controversial for those who like simple, elegant, uncomplicated models (KISS-like). Worse than that, while Sun et al. (2016), for example, acknowledge that the Medawar zone for empirical models is at a higher level of complicatedness than for theoretical models, the coverage implied by this conjecture is broader still. The level of complicatedness implied will also be controversial for those who don’t mind complex, complicated models with large numbers of parameters. It suggests that we might need to model ‘everything’, or that policy models are then too complicated for us to understand, and as a consequence, perhaps using simulations to analyse policy scenarios is inappropriate. The following considers each of these objections in turn with a view to developing a more nuanced analysis of the implications of such a conjecture.

Modelling ‘everything’ is a matter that is the easiest to reject as a necessary implication of modelling ‘more things’. Modelling, say, the international relations implications of proposed national policy on managing a global pandemic, does not mean one is modelling the lifecycle of extremophile bacteria, or ocean-atmosphere interactions arising from climate change, or the influence of in-home displays on domestic energy consumption, to choose a few random examples of a myriad things that are not modelled. It is not even clear what modelling ‘everything’ really means – phenomena in social and environmental systems can be modelled at diverse levels of detail, at scales from molecular to global. Fundamentally, it is not even clear that we have anything like a perception of ‘everything’, and hence no basis for representing ‘everything’ in a model. Further, the Borges argument[6] holds in that having a model that would be the same as reality makes it useless to study as it is then wiser to study reality directly. Neither universal agreement nor objective criteria[7] exist for the ‘correct’ level of complexity and complication at which to model phenomena, but failing to engage with a broader perspective on the systemic effects of phenomena leaves one open to the kind of excoriating criticism exemplified by Keen’s (2021) attack on economists’ analysis of climate change.

At the other end of the scale, doing no modelling at all is also a mistake. As Polhill and Edmonds (2023) argue, leaving simulation models out of policy analysis essentially makes the implicit assumption that human cognition is adequate to the task of deciding on appropriate courses of action facing a complex situation. There is no reason (besides hubris) to believe that this is necessarily the case, and plenty of evidence that it is not. Not least of such evidence is that many of the difficult decisions we now face around such things as managing climate change and biodiversity have been forced upon us by poor decision-making in the past.

Cognitive constraints and multiple modellers

This necessity to consider many dimensions of social life within models that are ‘close enough’ to the reality to convince decision-makers induces a risk of ‘over’-complexity. Its main default is the building of models that are too complicated for us to understand. This is a valid concern in the sense that building an artificial system that, though simpler than the real world, is still beyond human comprehension, hardly seems a worthwhile activity. The other concern is that of the knowledge needed by the modeller: how can one person be able to imagine an integrative model which includes (for example) employment, transportation, food, schools, international economy, and any other issue which is needed for a serious analysis of the consequences of policy decisions?

Options that still entail broader coverage but not a single overcomplicated integrated model are: 1/ step-by-step increase in the complexity of the model in a community of practitioners; 2/ confrontation of different simple models with different hypotheses and questions; 3/ superposition and integration of simple models into one, through a serious work on the convergence of ontologies (with a nod to Voinov and Shugart’s (2013) warnings).

  1. To illustrate this first approach, let us stay with the case of the epidemic model. One can start with an epidemiological simulation where we fit to the fact that if we tell people to stay at home then we will cut hospitalizations by enough that health services will not be overwhelmed. But then we are worried that this might have a negative impact on the economy. So we bring in modelling components that simulate all four combinations of person/business-to-person/business transactions, and this shows that if we pay businesses to keep employees on their books, we have a chance of rebooting the economy after the pandemic is over.[8] But then we are concerned that businesses might lie about who their employees are, that office-workers who can continue to work at home are privileged over those with other kinds of job, that those with a child-caring role in their households are disadvantaged in their ability to work at home if the schools are closed, and that the mental health of those who live alone is disproportionately impacted through cutting off their only means of social intercourse. And so more modelling components are brought in. In a social context, this incremental addition of the components of a complicated model may mean it is more comprehensible to the team of modellers.

    If the policy maker really wants to increase her capacity to understand her possible actions with models, she would also have to make sure to invite several researchers for each modelled aspect, as no single social science is free of controversy, and the discussions about consequences should rely on contradictory theories. If a complex model has to be built, it can indeed propose different hypotheses on behaviours, functioning of economy, sanitary risks depending on the type of encounter.[9] It is then more of a modelling ‘framework’ with several options for running various different specific models with different implementation options. One advantage of modelling that applies even in cases where Borges argument applies, is that testing out different hypotheses is harmless for humans (unlike empirical experiments) and can produce possible futures, seen as trajectories that can then be evaluated in real time with relevant indicators. With a serious group of modellers and statisticians, providing contradicting views, not only can the model be useful for developing prospective views, but also the evaluation of hypotheses could be done rapidly.

  2. The CoVprehension Collective (2020) showed another approach, more fluid in its organisation. The idea is “one question, one model”, and the constraint is to have a pedagogic result where a simple phenomenon would be illustrated. Different modellers could realise one or several models on simple issues, so that to explain one simple phenomenon, paradox or show a tautological affirmation. In the process, the CoVprehension team would create moving sub-teams, associate on one specific issue and propose their hypotheses and results in a very simple manner. Such a protocol was purely oriented for explanation to the public, but the idea would be to organise a similar dynamic for policy makers. The system is cheap (it was self-organised with researchers and engineers, with zero funding but their salary) and it sustained lively discussions, with different points of view. Questions could go from differences between possible NPI, with an algorithmic description of these NPI that could make the understanding of processes more precise, to an explanation of the reason why French supermarkets were missing toilet paper. Twenty questions were answered in two months, thus indicating that such a working dynamic is feasible in real-time and provides useful and interesting inputs to discussion.

  3. To avoid too complicated a model, the fusion of both approaches could also be conceived: the addition of dimensions to a large central model could be first tested through simple models, the main process of explanation could be found and this process reproduced within the theoretical framework of the large model. This would constitute both a production of diversity of points of view and models and the aggregation of all points of view in one large model. The fact that the model should be large is important, as ‘size matters’ in diffusion models (e.g. Gotts & Polhill 2010), and thus simple, small models would benefit from this work as well.

As some modellers like complex models (and can think with the help of these models) and others rely on simple stories to increase their understanding of the world, only the creation of an open community of diverse specialists and modellers, KISS as well as KIDS, such a collective step-by-step elaboration could resolve the central problem that ‘too complicated to understand’ is a relative, rather than absolute, assessment. One very important prerequisite of such collaboration is that there is genuine ‘horizontality’ of the community: where each participant is listened to seriously whatever their background, which can be an issue in interdisciplinary work, especially involving people of mixed career stage. Be that as it may, the central conjecture remains: agent-based modelling for policy analysis should be expected to involve even more complicated (assemblages of) models than empirical agent-based modelling.

Endnotes

[1] This point is the one that is the most disputed ex-post in France, where lockdowns were justified (as in other countries) to “protect hospitals”. In France, the idea was not to avoid deaths of older people (90% of deaths were people older than 60, this demographic being 20% of the population), but to avoid hospitals being overwhelmed with Covid cases taking the place of others. In France, the official data regarding hospital activity states that Covid cases represented 2% of hospitalizations and 5% of Intensive Care Unit (ICU) utilizations. Further, hospitals halved their workload from March to May 2020 because of almost all surgery being blocked to keep ICUs free. (In October-December 2020, although the epidemic was more significant at that time, the same decision was not taken). Arguably, 2% of 50% not an increase that should destroy a functioning system – https://www.atih.sante.fr/sites/default/files/public/content/4144/aah_2020_analyse_covid.pdf – page 2. Fixing dysfunction in the UK’s National Health Services has been a long-standing, and somewhat tedious, political and academic debate in the country for years, even before Covid (e.g. Smith 2007; Mannion & Braithwaite 2012; Pope & Burnes 2013; Edwards & Palmer 2019).

[2] An interesting difference that French people heard about was that in the UK, people could wander on the beaches during lockdowns, whereas in France it was forbidden to go to any natural area – indeed, it was forbidden to go further than one kilometre from home. Whereas, in fact, in the UK the lockdown restrictions were a ‘devolved matter’, with slightly different policies in each of the UK’s four member nations, though very similar legislation. In England, Section 6 paragraph (1) of The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 stated that “no person may leave the place where they are living without reasonable excuse”, with paragraph (2) covering examples of “reasonable excuses” including for exercise, obtaining basic necessities, and accessing public services. Similar wording was used by other devolved nations. None of the regulations stipulated any maximum distance from a person’s residence that these activities had to take place – interpretation of the UK’s law is based on the behaviour of the ‘reasonable person’ (the so-called ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ – see Łazowski 2021). However, differing interpretations of what ‘resonable people’ would do between the citizenry and the constabulary led to fixed penalty notices being issued for taking exercise more than five miles (eight kilometres) from home – e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jan/09/covid-derbyshire-police-to-review-lockdown-fines-after-walkers-given-200-penalties In Scotland, though the Statutory Instrument makes no mention of any distance, people were ‘given guidance’ not to travel more than five miles from home for leisure and recreation, and were still advised to stay “within their local area” after this restriction was lifted (see https://www.gov.scot/news/travel-restrictions-lifted/).

[3] A problem which seems to be true in various countries https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/new-academic-year-begins-unesco-warns-only-one-third-students-will-return-school
https://www.kff.org/other/report/kff-cnn-mental-health-in-america-survey/
https://eu.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/health/2023/05/15/school-avoidance-becomes-crisis-after-covid/11127563002/#:~:text=School%20avoidant%20behavior%2C%20also%20called,since%20the%20COVID%2D19%20pandemic
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-65954131

[4] https://www.cityam.com/omicron-mild-compared-to-delta-south-african-doctors-say/

[5] https://www.terrafemina.com/article/coronavirus-un-psy-alerte-sur-les-risques-du-confinement-pour-la-sante-mentale_a353002/1

[6] In 1946, in El hacedor, Borges described a country where the art of building maps is so excessive in the need for details that the whole country is covered by the ideal map. This leads to obvious troubles and the disappearance of geographic science in this country.

[7] See Brewer et al. (2016) if the Akaike Information Criterion is leaping to your mind at this assertion.

[8]  Although this assumption might not be stated that way anymore, as the hypothesis that many parts of the economy would hugely suffer started to reveal its truth even before the end of the crisis: a problem that had only been anticipated by a few prominent economists (e.g. Boyer, 2020). This failure shows mainly that the description that most economists make of the economy is too simplistic – as often reproached – to be able to anticipate massive disruptions. Everywhere in the world the informal sector was almost completely stopped as people could neither work in their job nor meet for information market exchange, which causes misery for a huge part of the earth population, among the most vulnerable (ILO, 2022).

[9] A real issue that became obvious is that the nosocomial infections are (still) extremely important in hospitals, as the evaluation of the number of infections in hospitals for Covid19 are estimated to be 20 to 40% during the first epidemic (Abbas et al. 2021).

Acknowledgements

GP’s work is supported by the Scottish Government Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division (project reference JHI-C5-1).

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© The authors under the Creative Commons’ Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY-ND) Licence (v4.0)

A Tale of Three Pandemic Models: Lessons Learned for Engagement with Policy Makers Before, During, and After a Crisis

By Emil Johansson1,2, Vittorio Nespeca3, Mikhail Sirenko4, Mijke van den Hurk5, Jason Thompson6, Kavin Narasimhan7, Michael Belfrage1, 2, Francesca Giardini8, and Alexander Melchior5,9

  1. Department of Computer Science and Media Technology, Malmö University, Sweden
  2. Internet of Things and People Research Center, Malmö University, Sweden
  3. Computational Science Lab, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  4. Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
  5. Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
  6. Transport, Health and Urban Design Research Lab, The University of Melbourne, Australia
  7. Centre for Research in Social Simulation, University of Surrey, United Kingdom
  8. Department of Sociology & Agricola School for Sustainable Development, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
  9. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, The Netherlands

Motivation

Pervasive and interconnected crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, global energy shortages, geopolitical conflicts, and climate change have shown how a stronger collaboration between science, policy, and crisis management is essential to foster societal resilience. As modellers and computational social scientists we want to help. Several cases of model-based policy support have shown the potential of using modelling and simulation as tools to prepare for, learn from (Adam and Gaudou, 2017), and respond to crises (Badham et al., 2021). At the same time, engaging with policy-makers to establish effective crisis-management solutions remains a challenge for many modellers due to lacking forums that promote and help develop sustained science-policy collaborations. Equally challenging is to find ways to provide effective solutions under changing circumstances, as it is often the case with crises.

Despite the existing guidance regarding how modellers can engage with policy makers e.g. (Vennix, 1996; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010), this guidance often does not account for the urgency that characterizes crisis response. In this article, we tell the stories of three different models developed during the COVID-19 pandemic in different parts of the world. For each of the models, we draw key lessons for modellers regarding how to engage with policy makers before, during, and after crises. Our goal is to communicate the findings from our experiences to  modellers and computational scientists who, like us, want to engage with policy makers to provide model-based policy and crisis management support. We use selected examples from Kurt Vonnegut’s 2004 lecture on ‘shapes of stories’ alongside analogy with Lewis Carroll’s Alice In Wonderland as inspiration for these stories.

Boy Meets Girl (Too Late)

A Social Simulation On the Corona Crisis’ (ASSOCC) tale

The perfect love story between social modellers and stakeholders would be they meet (pre-crisis), build a trusting foundation and then, when a crisis hits, they work together as a team, maybe have some fight, but overcome the crisis together and have a happily ever after.

In the case of the ASSOCC project, we as modellers met our stakeholders too late, (i.e., while we were already in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis). The stakeholders we aimed for had already met their ‘boy’: Epidemiological modellers. For them, we were just one of the many scientists showing new models and telling them that ours should be looked at. Although, for example, our model showed that using a track and tracing-app would not help reduce the rate of new COVID-19 infections (as turned out to be the case), our psychological and social approach was novel for them. It was not the right time to explain the importance of integrating these kinds of concepts in epidemiological models, so without this basic trust, they were reluctant to work with us.

The moral of our story is that not only should we invest in a (working) relationship during non-crisis times to get the stakeholders on board during a crisis, such an approach would be helpful for us modelers too. For example, we integrated both social and epidemiological models within the ASSOCC project. We wanted to validate our model with that used by Oxford University. However, our model choices were not compatible with this type of validation. Had we been working with these types of researchers before a pandemic, we could have built a proper foundation for validation.

So, our biggest lesson learned is the importance of having a good relationship with stakeholders before a crisis hits, when there is time to get into social models and show the advantages of using these. When you invest in building and consolidating this relationship over time, we promise a happily ever after for every social modeler and stakeholder (until the next crisis hits).

Modeller’s Adventures in Wonderland

A Health Emergency Response in Interconnected Systems (HERoS) tale

If you are a modeler, you are likely to be curious and imaginative, like Alice from “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.” You like to think about how the world works and make models that can capture these sometimes weird mechanisms. We are the same. When Covid came, we made a model of a city to understand how its citizens would behave.

But there is more. When Alice first saw the White Rabbit, she found him fascinating. A rabbit with a pocket watch which is too late, what could be more interesting? Similarly, our attention got caught by policymakers who wear waistcoats, who are always busy but can bring change. They must need a model that we made! But why are they running away? Our model is so helpful, just let us explain! Or maybe our model is not good enough?

Yes, we fell down deep into a rabbit hole. Our first encounter with a policymaker didn’t result in a happy “yes, let’s try your model out.” However, we kept knocking on doors. How many did Alice try? But alright, there is one. It seems too tiny. We met with a group of policymakers but had only 10 minutes to explain our large-scale data-driven agent-based-like model. How can we possibly do that? Drink from a “Drink me” bottle, which will make our presentation smaller! Well, that didn’t help. We rushed over all the model complexities too fast and got applause, but that’s it. Ok, we have the next one, which will last 1 hour. Quickly! Eat an “Eat me” cake that will make the presentation longer! Oh, too many unnecessary details this time. To the next venue!

We are in the garden. The garden of crisis response. And it is full of policymakers: Caterpillar, Duchess, Cheshire Cat and Mad Hatter. They talk riddles: “We need to consult with the Head of Paperclip Optimization and Supply Management,” want different things: “Can you tell us what will be the impact of a curfew. Hmm, yesterday?” and shift responsibility from one to another. Thankfully there is no Queen of Hearts who would order to behead us.

If the world of policymaking is complex, then the world of policymaking during the crisis is a wonderland. And we all live in it. We must overgrow our obsession with building better models, learn about its fuzzy inhabitants, and find a way to instead work together. Constant interaction and a better understanding of each other’s needs must be at the centre of modeler-policymaker relations.

“But I don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked.

“Oh, you can’t help that,” said the Cat: “we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad.”

“How do you know I’m mad?” said Alice.

“You must be,” said the Cat, “or you wouldn’t have come here.”

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

Cinderella – A city’s tale

Everyone thought Melbourne was just too ugly to go to the ball…..until a little magic happened.

Once upon a time, the bustling Antipodean city of Melbourne, Victoria found itself in the midst of a dark and disturbing period. While all other territories in the great continent of Australia had ridded themselves of the dreaded COVID-19 virus, it was itself, besieged. Illness and death coursed through the land.

Shunned, the city faced scorn and derision. It was dirty. Its sisters called it a “plague state” and the people felt great shame and sadness as their family, friends and colleagues continued to fall to the virus. All they wanted was a chance to rejoin their families and countryfolk at the ball. What could they do?

Though downtrodden, the kind-hearted and resilient residents of Melbourne were determined to regain control over their lives. They longed for a glimmer of sunshine on these long, gloomy days – a touch of magic, perhaps? They turned to their embattled leaders for answers. Where was their Fairy Godmother now?

In this moment of despair, a group of scientists offered a gift in the form of a powerful agent-based model that was running on a supercomputer. This model, the scientists said, might just hold the key to transforming the fate of the city from vanquished to victor (Blakely et al., 2020). What was this strange new science? This magical black box?

Other states and scientists scoffed. “You can never achieve this!”, they said. “What evidence do you have? These models are not to be trusted. Such a feat as to eliminate COVID-19 at this scale has never been done in the history of the world!” But what of it? Why should history matter? Quietly and determinedly, the citizens of Melbourne persisted. They doggedly followed the plan.

Deep down, even the scientists knew it was risky. People’s patience and enchantment with the mystical model would not last forever. Still, this was Melbourne’s only chance. They needed to eliminate the virus so it would no longer have a grip on their lives. The people bravely stuck to the plan and each day – even when schools and businesses began to re-open – the COVID numbers dwindled from what seemed like impossible heights. Each day they edged down…

and down…

and down…until…

Finally! As the clock struck midnight, the people of Melbourne achieved the impossible: they had defeated COVID-19 by eliminating transmission. With the help of the computer model’s magic, illness and death from the virus stopped. Melbourne had triumphed, emerging stronger and more united than ever before (Thompson et al., 2022a).

From that day forth, Melbourne was internationally celebrated as a shining example of resilience, determination, and the transformative power of hope. Tens of thousands of lives were saved – and after enduring great personal and community sacrifice, its people could once again dance at the ball.

But what was the fate of the scientists and the model? Did such an experience change the way agent-based social simulation was used in public health? Not really. The scientists went back to their normal jobs and the magic of the model remained just that – magic. Its influence vanished like fairy dust on a warm Summer’s evening.

Even to this day the model and its impact largely remains a mystery (despite over 10,000 words of ODD documentation). Occasionally, policy-makers or researchers going about their ordinary business might be heard to say, “Oh yes, the model. The one that kept us inside and ruined the economy. Or perhaps it was the other way around? I really can’t recall – it was all such a blur. Anyway, back to this new social problem – Shall we attack it with some big data and ML techniques?”.

The fairy dust has vanished but the concrete remains.

And in fairness, while agent-based social simulation remains mystical and our descriptions opaque, we cannot begrudge others for ever choosing concrete over dust (Thompson et al, 2022b).

Conclusions

So what is the moral of these tales? We consolidate our experiences into these main conclusions:

  • No connection means no impact. If modellers wish for their models to be useful before, during or after a crisis, then it is up to them to start establishing a connection and building trust with policymakers.
  • The window of opportunity for policy modelling during crises can be narrow, perhaps only a matter of days. Capturing it requires both that we can supply a model within the timeframe (impossible as it may appear) and that our relationship with stakeholders is already established.
  • Engagement with stakeholders requires knowledge and skills that might be too much to ask of modelers alone, including project management, communication with individuals without a technical background, and insight into the policymaking process.
  • Being useful only sometimes means being excellent. A good model is one that is useful. By investing more in building relationships with policymakers and learning about each other, we have a bigger chance of providing the needed insight. Such a shift, however, is radical and requires us to give up our obsession with the models and engage with the fuzziness of the world around us.
  • If we cannot communicate our models effectively, we cannot expect to build trust with end-users over the long term, whether they be policy-makers or researchers. Individual models – and agent-based social simulation in general – needs better understanding that can only be achieved through greater transparency and communication, however that is achieved.

As taxing, time-consuming and complex as the process of making policy impact with simulation models might be, it is very much a fight worth fighting; perhaps even more so during crises. Assuming our models would have a positive impact on the world, not striving to make this impact could be considered admitting defeat. Making models useful to policymakers starts with admitting the complexity of their environment and willingness to dedicate time and effort to learn about it and work together. That is how we can pave the way for many more stories with happy endings.

Acknowledgements

This piece is a result of discussions at the Lorentz workshop on “Agent Based Simulations for Societal Resilience in Crisis Situations” at Leiden, NL in earlier this year! We are grateful to the organisers of the workshop and to the Lorentz Center as funders and hosts for such a productive enterprise.

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